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The Public Communication of the Estonian Government Regarding the Refugee 
Crisis in 2015: Discourse Analytical Approach 
Indrek Niibo 
The aim of the MA thesis was to analyse the public communication of the Estonian 
government regarding the refugee crisis in 2015, namely whether the government has 
taken an active or passive role in the communication and which societal impacts the 
communication would have. More than one million refugees arriving by sea to EU during 
2015 challenged the European unity and the solidarity in many ways. In Estonian society, 
the increasing polarization caused by the opinions regarding the refugee crisis has put the 
government under the pressure of different interest groups.  
The discourse analysis of the government press releases and the news articles revealed the 
following: 
The reaction of the government during the first months of the crisis was critical towards 
the allocation of refugees and the general communication was inconsistent. After the 
allocation was decided in July, the position of the government turned favorable towards 
solidarity with EU and the refugees. At the same time, those groups who oppose the 
allocation were depicted rather in a negative way from the end of July onwards. From the 
results one can conlude that the government took over the position of the EU and presented 
it to the domestic audience in a rational way. One can speculate that the initial passiveness 
of the communication such as the sudden change in the position makes the refugee 
problem distant for an ordinary person and might increase the distrust towards the 
government. In addition, one can speculate that not forming a position towards certain 
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The rapid growth in the number of refugees crossing the borders of the European Union 
(EU) during 2015 have challenged many of the fundamental principals the EU is built on: 
solidarity,  respect of human dignity, justice etc. Because of the unexpectedly big number 
of asylum seekers, many countries could not afford to accomodate them in their territories 
anymore. The biggest burden has fallen on the countries on the southern border of EU, 
mainly Hungary, Italy and Greece, which are mostly just the transit countries for the 
refugees on their way to wealthier EU member states. Additionally, countries, which 
previously were out of the main migrant routes, such as the Baltic states, have become 
more and more influenced by the crisis, since the wealthier member states, who receive 
the majority of the asylum seekers, have started calling for the resettlement of the 
refugees across EU.  
Media has had a crucial role as well in shaping the way how the refugee crisis is 
perceived around Europe. The images all over the media about tragic accidents, which 
have happened with the refugees on their way to Europe, have called several governments 
into action to express solidarity with the refugees. On the other hand, governments in the 
Central and Eastern Europe have expressed more cautious up to hostile position towards 
letting more refugees into their countries. Estonia has maintained very conservative 
policy line towards the refugees and asylum seekers after the re-independence in 1991. 
However Estonia, as being part of EU, is inevitably influenced by the developments in 
the EU level as well. Moreover, the public opinion within the country is also not uniform 
and the opinions regarding the refugee crisis vary. The government in this regard is in the 
turmoil between the domestic opinion and the and escalating crisis in Europe, which calls 
the member states for joint actions to tackle the crisis. 
The aim of the following MA thesis is to study the public communication of the Estonian 
government during the refugee crisis in 2015 and to assess the role the government has 
taken in the communication with the public. The thesis is structured as following: the first 
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chapter describes the background of the refugee crisis: the asylum statistics within EU 
and among the member states, the position of the European Commission, the Estonian 
government and the public opinion in Estonia regarding the refugee crisis. The chpater 
three introduces the theoretical framework, which is based on Christopher Pierson´s 
concept of the modern state´s functions, which he states in his book “The Modern State” 
(2004) and Jürgen Habermas´ public sphere theory, which is based on the book “The 
Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere” (1991). The next chapter focuses on 
methodology and introduces the approach of critical discourse analysis (CDA based on 
Normal Fairclough, the analysis scheme and the research questions. 
The next chapter introduces the selection of the sample. For the analysis, the press 
releases of the government and the articles from the newspapers Postimees, SL Õhtuleht 
and Eesti Päevaleht will be used, where the Prime Minister, the Minister of the Interior 
and the Foreign Minister take a position about the refugee crisis. The thesis focuses on 
the time period starting from the 19/04/2015 up to 06/10/2015. The selection of the 
sample and the time frame will be further discussed in the chapter five.  
The next chapter represents the results and the following chapter presents the conclusions 
and discussions based on the results. The final chapter concludes the MA thesis.  
The selection of the topic is motivated mainly by the personal experience of the author. 
Making an internship in a human rights organisation in Budapest during summer 2015, 
working daily with the refugees in the Keleti Palyaudvar railway station, which was the 
hotspot of the crisis in 2015 and being a witness for some of the most crucial events 
during the refugee crisis in 2015, the author understands the significance of the crisis and 
the way how the lack of a proper communication from a government can worsen the 
degree of the crisis. 
Since the refugee crisis in 2015 is evidently recent, there has not been any considerable 
research on that. Taavi Eilat has researched the role of the Estonian government and 
media in a political scandal in his BA thesis (Eilat 2013). Even though the refugee crisis 
and a political scandal are not directly compearable, Eilat gives an overview how the 
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government copes with an important issue in the society. Refugee crisis is an event, 
which influences the society even in a larger scale and has much more far-reaching 
consequences and thus forming a position in this topic is even a bigger responsibility for 
the government. Marit Valk and Merle Lust have researched the media representation of 
immigration in the Estonian newspapers. (Valk 2015, Lust 2015) Both conclude that the 
media representation of the immigrants has become more positive compared to a decade 
or even five years ago, also Valk points out the existence of certain stereotypes in the 
media, such as using immigrants as the “others” in the society. (Valk 2015: 54-74)  
Valk finishes her research with 2014 and the current thesis is a temporal continuation for 
it. Valk also concludes her thesis that further studies could help to evaluate the media`s 
effect on the debate getting more active on other agenda levels as well. (Valk 2015: 91-
92) Although analyzing the government´s role in the communication is just one part of 
the discussions about the crisis in media, it is an influential aspect, which amplifies 
further discussions in the society. Furthermore, the government´s position can influence 
the public opinion and cause a chain of events within the society which has a broader 
effect.  
The thesis aims to find an answer to the question, wether the Estonian government has 
taken an active or a passive role in the public communication regarding the refugee crisis 
– based on the theoretical framework, there are several ways the government of a modern 
state can act in the public communication which at the end influences the way the public 
perceives the crisis and how successful is the integration of the refugees into the society 
at the end. 
Hereby I would like to thank a lot my supervisor Külliki Seppel, who helped me 
regarding finding relevant information and assisting in every step of writing the MA 
thesis. Also I would like to thank Hector Pagan and Louis, who gave valuable feedback to 









2.1. The application statistics in EU 
 
During the past decades, the number of asylum applications in the EU has been 
fluctuating, having a high point in 1992, when the EU-15 received around 672 thousand 
asylum applications and in 2001 when the EU-27 received 424 000. The period was 
followed by a relative stabilization until 2012 and then again, an increase year by year in 
the asylum applications: in 2013 the EU-28 received 431 000 asylum applications, in 
2014 627 000 and in 2015 close to 1.3 million. (Eurostat 02/03/2016)  
The main reason for the increasing number of the applications has been the ongoing war 
in Syria and the invasion of ISIS in Syria and Iraq, which has put the lives of many 
people in the Middle-East under a substantial threat and increased the number of people 
escaping from Syria and Iraq. This, on the other hand, has imposed increasing pressure on 
the overcrowded refugee camps in Turkey, from where the migrants are moving towards 
EU.
1
 This is illustrated by the increase in the first time applications within EU, which was 
in the EU-28 in 2015 approximately 66 000 (about 5%) less than the entire number of 
applicants.
2
 In 2015, the number of first time asylum applicants from Syria rose to 363 
thousand in the EU-28, which was 29% of the total number. Afghanis accounted for 14% 
of the total number and Iraqis for 10%. (Eurostat 02/03/2016) The number of Syrian 
refugees has almost tripled in comparison with 2014 and 2015, the number of applicants 
                                                          
1
 In addition, this has also increased the influx of migrants from other Middle-Eastern and African 
countries, among whom many are labelled as economic migrants. 
2
 A first time applicant in terms of international protection is the one who has given in an application for 
asylum for the first time in a given EU Member State and therefore does not include repeat applicants in 
that Member State. Thus a first time applicant is a number, which indicates newly arrived persons 
applying for international protection in the given Member State. (Eurostat 02/03/2016) 
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from Iraq has risen almost eight times and the number of applicants from Afganistan 
more than four times. (Appendix 1) 
Looking closer at the dynamics of the migrants and refugees arriving to EU, one can see a 
rapid growth since March (Appendix 4), while the number of refugees and migrants 
arriving by sea to Europe rose by approximately 20,000 compared to April and March 
2015, while the total number of migrants and refugees being in May already more than 
twice bigger than a year ago. The number continued to rise and reached to over 43,000 by 
June 2015, close to 80,000 in July, exceeded 130,000 in August, 160,000 in September 
and reached to the peak in October being more than 200,000. (UNHCR 03/2016) All in 
all it is estimated that during 2015 there were more than 1 million Mediterranian sea 
arrivals to Europe.   
 
2.2. The asylum applications among EU member 
states 
 
The rapid increase in the number of the asylum applications has not resulted in even 
distribution of the applicants among the EU member states. The number of first time 
asylum applicants in Germany for instance rose from 173 thousand in 2014 to 442 
thousand in 2015 (Appendix 2). Hungary, Sweden and Austria have also experienced a 
substantial increase in the number of the asylum applications. In relative terms, the 
biggest climb in the number of first time applicants were recorded in Finland (nine times), 
Hungary (more than four times) and Austria (more than three times). In Belgium, Spain, 
Germany, Luxembourg, Ireland and Sweden the number of first time asylum applicants 
has more than doubled during the same time period. By contrast in Romania, Croatia, 
Lithuania, Slovenia and Latvia the first time asylum applicants in 2015 has declined 
compared to that in 2014. (Eurostat 02/03/2016) In addition, there is a substantial number 
of migrants, who are not registrated at all and thus does not reflect in the official 
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statistics. So, one can see that the pressure on the EU member states caused by the 
refugee crisis has been different, which is likely to cause different reactions by the 
member states. 
 
2.3. The Dublin regulation (Dublin system) and its 
collapse 
 
The framework, in which the management of the asylum process within the EU member 
states and its close partners Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and Liechtenstein is supposed 
to work, is defined through the Dublin regulation (EU-No 604/2013), which entered into 
force in July 2013. The European Council on Refugees and Exiles explains it as 
following: “The Dublin regulation works predominantly on the basis of family links 
followed by responsibility assigned on the basis of the State through which the asylum 
seeker first entered, or the State responsible for their entry into the territory of the EU 
Member States, Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Switzerland. The aim of the 
Regulation is to ensure that one member state is responsible for the examination of an 
asylum application, to deter multiple asylum claims and to determine as quickly as 
possible the responsible Member State to ensure effective access to an asylum 
procedure.” (ECRE 2016) 
Although the Dublin Regulation has been a target of criticism already since its 
foundation, its aim according to many experts has not been to equalize the burden of 
refugees among EU member states, but rather to assign responsibility for processing an 
individual asylum application to a single Member State. (Fratzke 2015: 5) However, 
throughout 2015 the failure of the Dublin system has been accused by many Eastern- and 
Central-European Member States and beyond on a political level, in media and etc. In 
June 2015 the Hungarian government announced to the Austrian media they are not able 
to cope with the immense and uncontrolled influx of migrants into its territory anymore 
and will suspend the Dublin Regulation. The government spokesman Zoltán Kovács 
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claimed: “We all wish for a European solution, but we need to protect Hungarian interests 
and our population.” (Euractive 06/2015) As the crisis escalated rapidly during the 
summer, the Western-European countries started to also take action in responding to the 
situation and finding alternatives to the Dublin system. In August, Germany announced 
that it will suspend the Dublin System for the Syrian refugees (Euractive 08/2015) in 
order to respond to the entrapment of the refugees in Budapest for days (Appendix 6). In 
September also the European Council admitted that the Dublin system has collapsed: “A 
Parliamentary Assembly Migration Committee report claims that the Dublin asylum 
application system has collapsed and must be reformed urgently.” (Council of Europe 
10/09/2015) 
 
2.4.  The position of the European Commission 
 
It is difficult to say, when did the understanding on the EU level took place, that Europe 
is facing one of the biggest crisis in its recent history. However, already since the 
shipwreck close to Lampedusa, some solution was expected on the EU level and the EC, 
after realizing that the uncontrolled influx of migrants into Europe is challenging its 
unity, started to negotiate on a possible mechanism to tackle the crisis. The position of the 
Commission has been in favour of solidarity among the member states and with the 
refugees. Already at the end of April the EC reacted with establishing a plan to 
redistribute the refugees among the member states. On twenty-seventh of May the EC 
announced the First Implementation Package, which stated: “To trigger for the first time 
Article 78(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU in order to urgently relocate 
40,000 asylum seekers for the benefit of Italy and Greece; a Recommendation for a 
resettlement scheme for 20,000 persons from outside the EU; an Action Plan on 
Smuggling; and the necessary amendments to the EU Budget to reinforce the Triton and 
Poseidon operations at sea so that more lives can be saved.” (EC 27/05/2015) The Second 
Implementation Package of the EC from September 2015 states further measures to tackle 
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the crisis: an emergency relocation proposal for 120,000 persons in clear need of 
international protection from Greece, Hungary and Italy was made.
3
 (EC 09/09/2015) 
 
2.5. The position of the Estonian Government 
 
The asylum policy of Estonia after the re-independence in 1991 has been strict in 
comparison to the Western and Northern European countries. According to the yearbook 
of the Estonian Refugee Council from 2014, giving a protection to someone on the 
humanitarian basis is not possible according to Estonian legislation. In addition, Estonia 
has also not given temporary protection to anybody on the basis of a threat, when the 
person cannot return to his/her country of origin and there is a high probability that the 
refugee application cannot be proceeded at the moment. (Janson 2015) The legal basis for 
the latter procedure, however, exists in the Estonian legislation (VRKS, §5). According to 
the yearbook, the conservative position regarding giving asylum is illustrated also by the 
recognition percent in the asylum (the percent of the positive decisions among all 
decisions). While in Estonia the percent in 2014 was 36%
4
, the EU average was 45% and 
in the countries such as Sweden it was even 77%. (Janson 2015) Already in 2014 the 
UNHCR called upon States to provide resettlement or other forms of admission for up to 
30,000 of the most vulnerable Syrian refugees by the end of 2014, and for an additional 
                                                          
3
 The Second Implementation package included the following: 1) A crisis relocation mechanism to be 
added to the Dublin Regulation; 
2) A common European list of Safe Countries of Origin to be created; 
3) Improving the return policy by creating a common Return Handbook and an EU Action Plan on Return; 
4) A Communication on Public Procurement rules for Refugee Support Measures; 
5) Improving the communication on the external dimension of the refugee crisis; 
6) Creating an Emergency Trust Fund for Africa. 
The package takes into account the population of the member state, its GDP, the average number of past 
asylum applicants and the unemployment rate. The new regulation states a mandatory distribution model 
among EU member states (mandatory quotas), which will be agreed among a particular EU member states 
and the EC taking into account the formentioned criterias.  
 
4
 From the period 1997-2014 Estonia has worked through 614 asylum applications, from which 97 have 
been positive decisions, while in comparison with 2010 and 2014, the number of asylum applications has 
risen more than 5 times and in comparison with 2013 and 2014 1.6 times (Janson 2015). 
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100,000 Syrian refugees through 2016. (UNHCR 2014) However, according to the 
Estonian Refugee Council, Estonia has been repelling in participating in any of the 
UNHCR resettlement programs. (Janson 2015) 
After the shipwreck in Lampedusa, which prompted EC to direct actions, the member 
states also had to react and take more concrete positions. According to the First 
Implementation plan Estonia´s share to relocate the refugees was supposed to be 1064 
persons, which included the persons relocated from Italy and Greece as the countries 
most affected by the crisis and those who would be relocated through resettlement from 
outside of EU. (EC 27/05/2015) After negotiations with the European MI-s the country 
finally agreed to accept 150 refugees through the first allocation period. (Estonian 
Government 20/07/2015) According to the second plan, Estonia had to take 373 asylum 
seekers from Italy, Greece and Hungary, which is added by 150 refugees that Estonia had 
agreed to accept after the negotiations about the First Implementation Package, since the 
second Implementation Agenda was additional to the Commission’s proposal from May 
to relocate 40,000 people in clear need of international protection from Italy and Greece 
to other EU Member States from September. (EC 22/09/2015) 
 
2.6.  The public opinion in Estonia 
 
Before 2015 there was no comprehensive research on the public opinion about refugees in 
Estonia. TNS Emor conducted a survey in November 2015 to evaluate the public opinion 
in Estonia regarding the refugees and migrants. The results indicated that the 53% of the 
population claimed that admitting refugees is a threat to Estonian security and should not 
be done. (TNS Emor 2015) 
 In general the survey concluded an almost equal distribution of people who saw a threat 
in the refugees and those who did not. In addition, approximately 38% of the participants 




Thus one can conclude from the survey, that by the end of 2015, the Estonian society was 
divided among those more in favor and those who maintained a conservative stand 
regarding the refugees. The percentage of those against the refugee policy was even 
slightly bigger and thus represented a substantially large amount of people in the society. 
The survey was conducted at the end of 2015, approximately half a year after the crisis 
became relevant in the public discussions of Estonia. Because of the absence of 
comparative material, one cannot analyze the changes in the public opinion within the 
time period from April until October 2015, but since the survey was conducted at a time 
when the amount of information about the crisis had increased rapidly compared to April, 
one can assume that the percentage of people who had earlier considered the information 
inadequate about the refugee crisis was even bigger.  
Although Estonia maintains out of the main migration routes in Europe and is not a 
popular country among refugees to ask for asylum in the EU context, being a Member 
Statet of the Union, it is obliged to participate in the common asylum policy of the EU. 
The Dublin regulation, which had been the basis of the asylum policy before, was more 
suitable to Estonia, but less favorable to the countries, which face the biggest influx of 
migrants in EU, such as Greece and Italy. The new resettlement scheme initiated by the 
EC designated the Estonian proportion of admitting the refugees on its territory to 
increase remarkably, remaining still much lower as among the main target countries of 
the EU (Germany and Sweden). However, this new resettlement scheme contradicted 
with the hostile public opinion in Estonia, which led the government to the turmoil 
between those two competing interests. 
 
2.7.  The political context in Estonia 
 
The previous elections to the Estonian Parliament Riigikogu took place on 01/03/2015, 
with the following parties ensuring a place in the Parliament: The Reform Party - 30 
seats, The Central Party - 27 seats, SDP - 15 seats, IRL - 14 seats, Vabaerakond - 8 seats 
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and EKRE - 7 seats. (VVK 20.03.2015) While all the other parties except EKRE 
(Eestimaa Konservatiivne Rahvaerakond) are situated around the centre of the political 
spectrum, EKRE claims itself to be a national conservative party, while its political 
program clearly states “to stand against the mass migration to Estonia” and “to be 
preserve conservative values.” (EKRE homepage) EKRE has been labelled as a populist 
party by the other political parties, opposing liberal values, the immigration policy in 
Estonia and additionally putting strong critic on the other actions of the government. 
Obtaining 8.1% of the votes in the Parliament elections, the popularity of EKRE has risen 
throughout the time: if in September 2014 only 2% of the population claimed they would 
vote for EKRE in the Riigikogu elections, by February 2015 this number had risen to 9%.  
The support of EKRE was steady until September 2015 and then started to rise again. 
(TNS Emor 2016) Although there are multiple reasons for such a growth, at least part of 
it can be attributed to using the anti-migration rhetorics to appeal to the conservative 
minded population of Estonia.    
The Reform Party, who got the biggest number of seats in the Parliament, was initiated to 
form the new government by the president. The new government, which started to operate 
on 09/04/2015, consists of the Reform Party, SDP and IRL. Although Vabaerakond was 
also invited to the negotiations round, their participation was soon rejected by the Reform 
Party. Unlike EKRE, the support of all the three government parties has declined after the 
elections: the most remarkably, the support of IRL has dropped by half by September 
2015 compared to February. (TNS Emor 2016) At the same time, the support of the 
opposition parties has risen throughout 2015. Thus one can see that the support of the 
parties, which form the government and which are responsible for carrying actions at the 
refugee crisis, has declined and the support of the opposition parties, which do not have a 
direct responsibility in tackling the crisis, has stood steady or increased. One can thus 
assume that the position of the government throughout the crisis has been challenging – 
on the one hand to be expected to act in the crisis and form a position, on the other hand, 
to deal with the declining popularity and face hostile opinion regarding the immigration. 
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The most involved in tacling the refugee crisis are the following ministers: the Prime 
Minister as the head of the government and the representative of the country, the Foreign 
Minister whose aim is to represent the country in international relations, including in 
meetings on the EU level, the Minister of the Interior, whos responsibility is to organise 
the migration issues in Estonia and the Minister of Social Protection, whos aim is to 
organise the social care and social policy in Estonia, including the ones related to the 
resettlement of the refugees. (Republic of Estonia Government 2016) The following 
analysis will focus on the positions of the three ministers: the Prime Minister Taavi 
Rõivas (in office since 26.03.2014), the Minister of the Interior Hanno Pevkur (in office 
since 26.03.2014) and the Foreign Minister Keit Pentus-Rosimannus (in office since 
17.11.2014). Because of an accusation to be part of the Autorollo political scandal 
(Äripäev 2016) however, she resigned on 01.07.2015 and was replaced with Marina 
Kaljurand on 16.07.2015. In addition to that, the government was also challenged with 
another political scandal: on 14/09/2015, the Minister of Enterpreneurship Urve Palo 
(SDP) resigned because of a corruption scandal in the Tallinn Port. (Einmann 2015) As a 
conclusion one can say, that in addition to facing the challenge of the refugee crisis and 
taking into account the solidarity among the EU member states, the government was also 
in a position, where it had to deal with political scandals, face the increase of the right 
populist party EKRE, deal with the decline of popularity among all of the government 









3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The following chapter describes the theoretical framework that the research is based on. 
First of all, the chapter describes the Modern State theory of Christopher Pierson, which 
formulates the functions of the government in a modern state, escpecially those related to 
the immigration and public communication. Thereafter, the chapter continues with the 
public sphere theory of Jürgen Habermas, which states the concept of the modern (re-
feudalized) public sphere, which describes contemporary societies and is opposed to the 
so-called authentic public sphere, which characterised the states in the nineteenth century. 
Both theories support the hypothesis formulated in the chapter one.  
 
3.1. Functions of modern state 
 
Christopher Pierson is the author of the influential book “The modern state” (2004). 
Within the frames of the modern state functions, he has brought various characteristics 
that the modern states possess. One of those qualities that characterizes the democratic 
modern state is the variety of opinions, which often compete with each other. If the 
government is democratically elected, it has to take into account the prevailing attitudes 
and interests within the society to maintain its position. (Pierson 2004: 56-57)  The 
chapter two already discussed the diverging interests within the Estonian society 
regarding the refugee crisis, but also the external dimension, since Estonia is a member of 
the EU and thus influenced by the decisions taken on the supranational level. Thus, it is 
important to define the role of the governments in the democratic societies in responding 
to the variety of ideas and interests first. 
One of the most influential theories in describing the functioning of the modern state is 
the theory of pluralism. Robert A. Dahl sees pluralism as a condition where various 
groups, be it political parties, business groups, non-profit organizations or other 
formations based on certain interests within society, compete with each other on the 
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political arena. The role of the state or more precisely, the ruling political parties forming 
the government, is to find a balance between those groups or harmonize plurality in some 
way. (Floyd; Dahl 1962: 517-519). The concept of pluralism is further developed by 
Christopher Pierson who describes the modern state an entity where the power is found in 
many places and different interest groups are able to mobilize various sorts of resources 
to materialize their interests. He also argues that the citizens in a pluralistic modern 
society share a consensus about  the rules of the so-called political game, meaning not 
that the citizens must share any substantial amount of beliefs or agree on how the public 
policy should work, but rather that they are willing to agree or disagree with the politics 
and they accept that there should be a diversity of interests within the society. (Pierson 
2004: 56-58) 
Pierson claims that the situation where all the interests of those stakeholders are taken 
equally into account, is strongly idealistic and often some groups play a bigger role in the 
society than the others. Some scholars (such as Dahl and Lindblom) express strong 
criticism towards the pluralistic point of view, addressing that interest groups such as 
business interests stand out from the others (Dahl 1962), but those who still agree on the 
pluralistic point of view point out that those groups command different resources in 
addition to the financial ones to realize their interests. (Pierson 2004: 58) 
Taking into account the complexity and diversity of interests and interest groups within 
society, Pierson places a strong emphasis on the state as an actor to balance or harmonize 
those interests. In this regard the function of the modern state is not only to reflect the 
pluralistic patterns of the society and remain a neutral actor, but also to contribute as a 
mediator to balance the forces and find a suitable compromise that best satisfies the needs 
of those competing interest groups or reflects the public interest in the best possible way. 
In an even more radical view, the state is not only a mediator and harmonizer, but it plays 
an active role in fulfilling its own political agenda. In this case the state, in addition to 
being a reconciliatory, can also take a decisive role in shifting public policy in one 
direction or another. In this case, politicians are capable of manipulating the cleavages 
and interests in civil society. (Pierson 2004: 58) 
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Although the role of action of the modern state among the opinions of different pluralists 
vary, Pierson still concludes that the state has a function in responding somehow to a 
variety of interests: in either taking a mediator or harmonizer role or in being more active 
and fulfilling its own political agenda. (ibid)  
The competition among interest groups within and outside the state is described in the 
changing role of the modern state in terms of making or deciding on the migration/asylum 
policy. If migration itself by its nature is already an international issue, by the twenty-first 
century, the state has less and less say in deciding the patterns of the migration and 
asylum policy. Pierson describes that although the state seemingly decides whom to 
accept in the country or not, there is a substantial outside pressure, be it the international 
organisations, other countries, lobby groups of certain ethnicities etc. (Pierson 2004: 164-
166) States in this sense have to make decisions on the immigration and asylum policy 
taking into account the humanitarian discourses
5
 from the international arena, such as the 
domestic opinion
6
, which often tends to be cautious or negative. The humanitarian 
discourse however tends to consolidate also in the domestic arena, which has definitely 
been the case in some of the post communist countries. As already seen in the chapter 
two, the Estonian state has been in the case of immigration in the turmoil between the 
humanitarian position of the EC, which calls for solidarity with the migrants and on the 




Small countries in EU such as Estonia have less power in changing the global trends, 
such as migration. Furthermore, being strongly influenced by the EU financial aid and the 
common defence of NATO, it is likely that the decisions made on the EU level have to be 
taken into account by the Estonian government as much as the domestic opinion 
                                                          
5
 Expressing solidarity with people and addressing humane values. 
6
 Public opinion within the country. 
7
 Although the states often try to maintain a control over their immigration policy and challenge the 
pressure from the international level, it is hindered by the increasing demographic problems of the 
European population (and more broadly, modern societies), where labour force can be seen as a solution 




regarding refugees. In order to maintain good relationship with the other EU countries but 
at the same time to preserve the trust of the electorate in the domestic arena, the 
government has to make sense of the variety of opinions prevailing in the society and in 
the international arena and communicate with the public.  
 
3.2. Habermas and the authentic versus the re-
feudalized public sphere 
 
When Pierson looks at the role of the state as rather a positive phenomenon, Jürgen 
Habermas, originally from the Frankfurt school, is more critical about the current role of 
the state. Habermas (1991) describes the structural transformation of the state and the 
public sphere from the mid nineteenth century (which he consideres the ideal form of the 
public sphere) onwards, while the state takes a bigger role in the lives of its citizens with 
the emergence of the so-called social or the welfare state. The result of the emergence of 
the social state was the replacement of the critical and grounded debates with commercial 
interests, which started to dominate the media. The new mass culture which replaced the 
earlier bourgeois culture had to be adapted to the needs of the masses, which meant also 
less educated populace. This also meant that new means of media emerged which best 
fitted to the needs of the masses – the TV instead of radio, films etc, were easier to follow 
and helped to reach a larger audience with less effort (Habermas 1991; O'Sullivan, 
Hartley, Saunders, & Fiske, 1983: 130). 
The transformation of the public sphere also meant that private interests reached to media 
and they took over the previous public interests. The media commercialized and different 
groups started to lobby their interests through media, creating an impression that they 
actually represent the public interests. The aim of the media now was to “sell” private 
interests without any rational debates. This also meant that commercialization was 
adopted by the state or more precisely by political parties who were seen as 
representatives of some private interests. Thus, the aim of political parties was to find a 
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compromise between those private interests through the debates where important 
decisions are actually made in the backrooms. (Habermas 1991: 160-171). 
Accordingly Habermas sees the role of the modern state a bit differently from that of 
Pierson. While Pierson sees the role of the state as a rather positive one, finding the best 
compromise among the interest groups and leading the communication into more rational 
tracks, Habermas sees this rationalization only as formality, where state actually just 
“sells” some interests – be it other interest groups or its own political agenda. However, 
whether seemingly or actually, in both cases the state´s role is to bring the debates into 
more rational tracks. 
In addition to the option proposed by Habermas that the state advertises interests of some 
stakeholders or the theory of Pierson that the governments harmonize the interest groups 
and possibly lead the discussions into more rational tracks, it is also possible that the 
government acts according to its own political agenda, takes an expectant position or 
avoids taking a position at all.  
 
3.3. Research questions 
The thesis aims to find an answer to the following question: has the Estonian government 
taken an active or a passive role in the public communication regarding the refugee 
crisis? 
In order to answer the research question, the following sub-questions will be answered:  
1)      What were the triggering forces for the government to form a position in 
media or through press releases? (different events, stakeholders) 




3) Was the communication of the government consistent or occasional? 


















4. Methodology and sample 
 
This chapter presents the analysis scheme, which is based on the Norman Fairclough´s 
approach of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). As following, the chapter will describe 
the selection of the sample and the time frame.  
 
4.1. Theory of social constructivism 
 
The social constructionism theory is an influential theory, being often combined with the 
method of discourse analysis, which aims to analyse the discourses behind the social 
interactions taking place in the society. The main scholars in the social sciences behind 
this concept are Berger and Luckmann and the basic argument behind it says that “reality 
is socially constructed and the sociology of knowledge must analyse the process in which 
this occurs.” (Berger, Luckmann 1966:13) However, the terms social constructionism and 
constructivism are often used interchangeably, while some scholars such as Charmaz use 
them under the single word constructivism. (Charmaz, 2000, 2006) Both social 
constructionists and social constructivists generally agree that the reality is not something 
of an objective truth, but rather that multiple realities exist and interact with each other. 
(Burr 2003)  
Taking the position that the reality is socially constructed and the communication as an 
aspect of the social life takes place in the framework of the social constructs, the political 
parties which take part in public communication are also influenced by the social norms 
within the society and the social structures which lie behind them. Those social norms 
come from the common truths and knowledge about how the social roles should be 
divided, which in turn are also the result of the social interactions and construction. 
Gergen describes this as following: “Our ways of understanding the world are created and 
maintained by social processes.” (Gergen 1985: 268 via Burr 1995:4) This also means 
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that knowledge is created through social interaction in which we construct common truths 
and compete about what is true and false. This means that the social norms are changing 
over time through the interaction. Those norms are coded and conveyed in the language, 
which on the other hand is subject to the social norms themselves.  
 
4.3. Normal Fairclough and the critical discourse 
analysis 
 
The methodology is based on the critical discourse analysis model (CDA), which 
originates from Norman Fairclough. CDA as an approach was chosen, because it is 
designed to analyse the textual structures in depth, which is the aim of the current 
research.  
 According to Fairclough, the usage of language and the social structures are 
interconnected and influence each other. Namely he claims that the existing social 
structures and power relations within a society impose restrictions on the usage of 
language and influence which way the words, grammar, or other components of a 
language are used. At the same time, he also claims that the language itself can reproduce 
the social norms and structures or create new patterns in the social structures. This is an 
important base to analyse, which components of the power relations and social structures 
can be decoded from the language the government uses in the communication, since 
according to Fairclough, the usage of language in this way influences the perception of 
the social norms and reproduce them and thus influences how the refugee crisis is 
perceived in public. (Fairclough 1996: 84-92)  
The analysis focuses on three dimensions: first, looking at the description of the formal 
components of the text – grammar, vocabulary and other components of the text. Second, 
analyzing the connections between the text itself and the discursive practices – text in this 
sense is seen in a wider social context where the particular text was created, but also the 
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social context of the receivers of the text are taken into account – since the producer of 
the text takes into account the social context and social capabilities of the receiver of the 
text, it influences the usage of the language. Thirdly, the social interaction between the 
speaker and the receiver is seen in a wider social context, where the overall societal 
patterns are taken into account. (Titcher, Meyer, Wodak & Vetter 2000: 152)  
 
4.4. The methodological scheme based on N. 
Fairclough 
 
Taking into account the three dimensional analysis scheme, the following categories will 
be analyzed in regard of the governmental communication in Estonia.  
 
4.4.1. The vocabulary 
 
The usage of synonyms: which words are used to define the refugees and the crisis. For 
example, are the refugees named with the word “migrant” or “refugee” and in which 
context will one or another word be used? Which words are used to define the crisis? For 
instance, is the crisis seen in a particular region or a European crisis? Analysing the usage 
of synonyms was chosen as a category, since the way how the refugees and the crisis are 
defined reflects the perceptions of them. Attributing names to the refugees can be 
subconscious but also intentional, aimed by changing the perception of the audience. For 
example, if the refugees are defined often by words which address humane dimension, it 
is probable that the speaker aims to induce compassion and solidarity in the reader. On 
the other hand, if the refugees are defined by impersonal features (for example through 
numbers), this can be subconscious but sill have a societal impact – the reader starting to 
perceive the refugees in an abstract way. Analysing the antonyms and pronouns was also 
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intended to be included in the analysis, but since it did not reveile significantly important 
results, those categories were left out at the end. 
 
4.4.2. The grammatical structures 
 
Contrasting: which interest groups/stakeholders are contrasted through the texts.  
1) Whether the government opposes the opinion of the Estonian government with 
other competing opinions (other countries, EU)?  
2) Whether the government opposes some groups within the Estonian society (for 
example the political parties, the different opinions among the population)? 
If contrasting occurs, one can speculate, which are the reasons behind contrasting 
different groups. Does the government want to make a moral statement with it? For 
example, if the government opposes often the opinion of the Estonian government and the 
EU, one can assume it wants to appeal to the domestic audience.  
Anaylsing the voice of the sentences (usage of active/passive voice) did not reveile 
relevant information to be used for the final conclusions and thus was left out from the 
analysis. 
 
4.4.3. Textual structures 
 
Frames: In order to analyze the textual structures and more precisely, the patterns, which 
affect the presentation of the information in a particular way, the framing theory 
developed by Robert M. Entman offers a theoretical background. According to Entman, 
the individuals have a selective influence on how the meanings of the words are 
perceived, depending on various frames in thought and in communication. (Entman 1993)  
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The frames have four functions: they “1) define problems – determine what a casual 
agent is doing with what costs and benefits, usually measured in terms of common 
cultural values 2) diagnose causes - identify the forces creating the problem 3) make 
moral judgments- evaluate causal agents and their effects and 4) suggest remedies - offer 
and justify treatments for the problems and predict their likely effects.” (Entman 1993: 
52)  
Frames at the same time have at least four locations in the communication process: first 
of all, the communicators who make either conscious or unconscious judgments on what 
to say. This judgment is guided by their frames of thought which influence their beliefs 
and perceptions about the world. Secondly, the frames appear in the text itself, which 
contain various key words, phrases, stereotypes and other sources of information, which 
at the same time reinforce those frames. Thirdly, the receiver, who´s thinking and 
perception of the text is also influenced by frames. However, those frames do not have to 
be the same frames (and often are not) that are coded in the text or originate from the 
communicator. Lastly, there is the culture, which is a set of different frames, which are 
accepted by most of the people in the society. (Entman 1993: 52-53) The current analysis 
takes mostly into account the frames presented by the communicator (the ministers) and 
the frames which affect the perception of the reader. 
On the basis of the Entman´s framing theory, the existence of the frames in the text as the 
source of information between the communicator as the Estonian government and the 
receiver as the Estonian public audience will be analyzed. Taking into account the four 
main functions of the frames, the analysis tries to answer the following questions: 
1) Which aspects of the crisis are defined by the Estonian government as relevant 
to talk about in the refugee crisis? – to define weather some issues are 
emphasized or some others missed out.  
2) Which are the main forces that created the refugee crisis and are involved in 
the maintenance of it according to the Estonian government? 
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3) Which are the moral judgments that the Estonian government has made 
regarding the refugee crisis? 
4) Which are the possible solutions that the Estonian government sees in tackling 
the refugee crisis? 
Context: 
1) The usage of interdiscursivity within the texts: which other discourses can be 
seen in the text? In other words: which other stakeholders are reflected through 
the texts: the EU institutions, the other EU countries, the Estonian diaspora, the 
Estonian citizens in Estonia etc? If for example the humanitarian discourse is 
prevailing in the texts, can one assume this comes from somewhere else (other 
interest group, such as EU etc)?  
2) The cohesion in the opinions presented in the text: how much do the texts reflect 
competing opinions/cohesion within the government? – the existence of 
competing opinions can hinder taking firm positions and thus the government 
taking its role to mediate/rationalise the debate.  
The aim of analysing the contextual structures is to see weather the text itself or its 
context reflects the existence of other discourses/interest groups, which position has to be 
taken into account by the government. It also gives a hint how does the government relate 
itself to those interest groups, how does it morally judge the crisis and which is the 








4.5. The sample 
 
The thesis will focus on the following sources:  
1) Newspapers: Postimees, Eesti Päevaleht, SL Õhtuleht  
2) The press releases of the Government Communication Unit (GCU), where the 
Prime Minister (PM in the analysis) Taavi Rõivas, the Minister of the Interior (MI 
in the analysis) Hanno Pevkur or the Foreign Minister (FM in the analysis) Keit 
Pentus-Rosimannus and Marina Kaljurand take a position 
Those newspapers were chosen because they are among the most read daily newspapers 
in Estonia (by edition) according to the Estonian Newspapers Associtation and thus are 
likely to have a wider influence in the society. (Estonian Newspaper Association 
02/2015) Taking more newspapers into consideration would have also remained too 
ambitious goal and outside the scope of the thesis. In addition, the press releases of the 
government represent the first sources where a government shares its positions in the 
public and one can speculate, which shape the ground for the further debate in the media 
and more broadly, in public. The PM, the FM and the MI were chosen, since they are the 
most involved in the refugee crisis – the PM and the FM as the representors of the 
government abroad and the MI who participates in the EU level meetings in regard of the 
allocation question of the refugees. In addition, during the debates, those three ministers 
were present more often, when government formed an opinion through media.  
 
4.6. Time range and the collection of the Sampole 
 
The data will be collected, taking into account the most important events from the time 
period of 19/04/2015 when a ship with hundreds of refugees sunk close to the island 
Lampedusa in the Mediterranian sea until 06/10/2015 when the Chanchellor of the 
German Federal Republic Angela Merkel and the president of the French Republic 
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Francois Hollande gave a symbolic speech in front of the European Parliament to address 
mutual solidarity in the refugee crisis. Those two events were chosen, since the shipwreck 
close to Lampedusa brought the refugee crisis more actively into the public discussions 
and influenced the EC to take an active position in the crisis. 06/10 was chosen as the end 
date for the analysis, since it can be seen as a climax of the humanitarian discourse in the 
crisis – the terror attacks in November in Paris changed the course of discussions around 
the refugee crisis. In between of the time frame mentioned before, the most important 
events were chosen (Appendix 7), which had an impact on the discussions through media 
(there was more than one artickle after the event in one of the newspapers or a 
government press release). The events were chosen by the following criterias: when some 
new measure was decided on the EU level, which affected Estonia (for instance the 
agreements on the implementation packages by EC), the ones, which had European wide 
influence (for example the closing of borders between Schengen states, tragic accidents 
with refugees, entrapment of refugees in Budapest etc), the ones which had an influence 
in Estonia (the fire in the Vao refugee centre) or media events which are expected to 
cause government reaction (for example the test calculation of extraordinarly large 
number of refugees that Estonia has to admit, written in „The Spiegel“). The full list of 
events is presented in Appendix 7.  
The government press releases and articles from the newspapers (Postimees, Eesti 
Päevaleht, SL Õhtuleht), which were written up to one week after the chosen events, were 
taken into the analysis. The press releases were found online from the government 
homepage (valitsus.ee/en) and the newspapers were found in printed version, since not all 
articles, which exist in printed media can be found online. The articles and press releases 
had to meet three criterias: first, they had to be about the refugee crisis, second, they had 
to be within the formenioned timeframe and third, there had to be a position of the 
Foreign Minister, Minister of the Interior or the Prime Minister present. The positions of 
the ministers were considerd only if they were direct quotations, since otherwise it is not 
possible to analyse the lexical patterns: when referring to the ministers, the journalists 
adapt the language and the lexical information gets missing. Analysing the journalistic 
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representation in the articles remains out of the scope of this thesis. All in all, 44 
newspaper articles and 15 press releases were found eligible for the analysis.  
In many articles there was just one or two sentences of quotations from the ministers, 
while in the others there was a long interview, thus the volume of the quotations between 
different articles and press releases varies greatly. Other categories such as the usage of 
pronouns and antonyms and the usage of passive/active voice was considered at first, but 
since this would have exceeded the scope of the analysis,  the amount of categories had to 
be reduced. At the end, contrasting and the usage of synonyms were considered the most 
informative in order to answer the research question. Analysing the usage of 
passive/active voice and the usage of pronouns and antonyms did not reveile strong 
patterns. 
A challenging aspect throughout the analysis was that the scope of the articles/press 
releases where the position of the ministers was present differend greatly among the 
ministers. While the position of the FM ministers was present only in a few articles, the 
PM and the MI were represented in most of the texts. Also some issues such as blaming 
Russia in the crisis or addressing the vagueness in the negotiations were singular cases 
and it is not possible to say if those present just the opinions of the ministers or the 
general position of the party/government. Since minsiters from three ministries were 
taken into consideration, one cannot make conclusive remarks about the position of the 
entire government.  
Another underlying challenge was the translation. Since the majority of the press releases 
and all news articles were in Estonian, part of the information through translation gets 
always missing. Thus the English translations should be taken with criticism. The original 






5. THE RESULTS 
 
The following chapter will present the results. The chapter is made up of the following 
subchapters: the vocabulary, the grammar, the textual structures and the contextual 
structures. The discussions and the conclusions will follow in the next chapter.  
 
5.1. The usage of synonyms 
 
5.1.1. Naming and defining refugees 
 
The general attitude of the ministers about the migrants was either positive or neutral 
which was also reflected through the vocabulary used by the ministers. The word refugee 
(either põgenik or pagulane)
8
 was used in the context when the ministers presented 
factual claims (for instance when elaborating about the allocated persons to Estonia from 
Greece and Italy in accordance to the Implementation Packages implemented by the EC, 
meaning those migrants who are already granted asylum and thus can be labeled as 
refugees with certainty), for example when the PM expressed the positive attitude of the 
enterpreneurs towards the arrival of refugees: “Several businesses have declared their 
readiness to offer employment to the refugees…” (GCU 16.09) or when it was necessary 
to make it explicit to draw a line between people who need to escape the war and those 
who are leaving their countries with other reasons. For instance, when explaining the 
position of Estonia to his Latvian colleague, the PM said: “Naturally, we should focus on 
helping war refugees during crisis.” (Tampere 11.09) Here the word war was made 
explicit to address the people who need help. In another example, the PM explained the 
measures Estonia has to take in addition to the resettlement: “While helping the war 
                                                          
8
 Estonian language differentiates the words pagulane  and põgenik, while in English there is only one 
word – refugee. While according to the yearbook of the ERG (Janson 2015) põgenik is a general term 
refering to both, those who have already granted asylum and those who have not, the word pagulane 




refugees closer to their homes, we reduce the migration pressure to Europe.”i (GCU 
16.09) Here again, the word war was used to specify that certain group of people needs 
help. The word human/person was used when addressing the humane dimension of the 
crisis. For example, when talking about the shipwreck close to Lampedusa the FM said: 
“There are real people behind the numbers.”ii (Eesti Päevaleht 24.04, nr 79) She also used 
words frightened (hirmunu) and desperate (meeleheitel) in order to induce compassion in 
the reader. Also the PM emphasized the humane dimension of the crisis regarding the 
shipwreck, saying “In the situation when people drown tragically we have to really deal 
with the problem…”iii The word human (inimene) was also used when expressing that the 
refugees are the same as the Estonian people, for example when the PM claimed in the 
Vao refugee centre: “The Estonian state defends the rights of all the people living here.”iv 
(GCU 03.09) Although the word refugee (põgenik/pagulane) was used more often, it was 
so due to the context – the discussions were focused mostly around the allocation of the 
refugees.  
 
5.1.2. Defining the crisis 
 
The ministers used the words refugee crisis (pagulaskriis) and migration crisis 
(migratsioonikriis) intertwined, where it was not exactly clarified wheather it was aimed 
by making a clear division between those two or not. For example when reflecting on the 
decisions made in European Council at the end of September, the PM said: “Today we 
agreed on specific steps that we can take quickly to alleviate the migrant crisis.” 
(Tampere 24.09). At the same time, when addressing the same issue, the PM used the 
word refugee crisis: "Resolving the refugee crisis will not happen quickly or easily but if 
we work on it together, with conscientiousness and solidarity, we can begin to alleviate 
the situation." In this case the reader has an impression that the refugees and migrants are 





At different cases, the ministers made explicit the distinction 
between a refugee and a migrant (GCU 08.09), however, infrequently the usage of 
refugee crisis and migration crisis seemed random and not to follow a certain pattern, 
which created confusion. 
 In addition to calling it the refugee crisis and migration crisis, the PM also used the 
phrase Mediterranian crisis for a few times. For instance, prior to the European Council 
meeting at the end of June, the PM said: “Estonia understands that there is a crisis 
situation and is ready to contribute to solving the Mediterranean crisis…” (GCU 24.06) 
creating an impression that the crisis is only about the Mediterranian countries. The aim 
in this case was probably to address that the crisis is the deepest at the Mediterranian area, 
for example when talking about the opposition of Estonia to the quota system, the 
government (GCU) addressed: “Estonia is in the opinion that all Member States should 
contribute to alleviating the Mediterranean migrant crisis….” (GCU 27.05) Even if the 
intention was to raise awareness on the issue that the Mediterranian countries need some 
help from the other EU member states as well, this might create an impression to the 
reader, that the government sees the crisis primarily in the Mediterranian region and not 
as a European issue. 
 
5.1.3. Impersonification of refugees 
 
One underlying issue was creating an impersonal and abstract impression about the 
refugees with identifying them with the word number/bulk of people (arv/inimmass). For 
example when commenting on the initial proposal of the EC to allocate 1064 refugees to 
Estonia, the PM said: “We are not capable to cope with such a big bulk of people.“v 
(Postimees nr 133-7427) If the FM had addressed the need to see real people behind 
numbers, the main discussions were about numbers without humane dimension. For 
example the PM stated in June about the position of Estonia: “Right now we work on that 
                                                          
9
 This has been the problem in the public perception in labeling all migrants under the same category and 
attributing characteristics to one or another group which are not relevant. 
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how to make it clear for the EC that those numbers are unfair.” vi (SL Õhtuleht, 10.06) At 
the same time, the PM himself made it clear that talking about people is more important 
than numbers. For example, when the second allocation was decided in September he 
claimed: “We do not have to argue anymore about the formulas, we can now focus on the 
root of the problem and get ready to help people.”vii (GCU 08.09) If, on the one hand, the 
ministers addressed the humane dimension and called to see real people behind the 
problems, being focused on numbers and formulas creates an impersonal impression 





5.2.1. The opinion of EU and the Estonian government 
 
The voluntarism approach: Throughout the articles and press releases the government 
used direct and indirect contrasting of different groups/stakeholders (direct contrasting 
was present in one or another form in every third text). During the first months (April-
July) the opposition of the opinion of the Estonian government and the EC was present in 
almost every text. For example, the PM commented on the Estonian position that he had 
introduced to the EC as following: “We understand the need that all countries must 
contribute to solving the crisis, but we want the agreement to be voluntary and fair.” 
(Vaher 25.06) In this case the first half of the sentence We understand the need that all 
countries must contribute to solving the crisis refers to the opinion of the EC, while the 
second half but we want the agreement to be voluntary and fair to the general position of 
the government to oppose the mandatory quota system. The MI commented the Estonian 
position even more clearly saying “We have to manage to show to the sceptical countries 
who insisted on the duties and the quotas that one could also reach the results with a 
voluntary contribution.”viii (Postimees, nr 146-7440) Here the MI differentiated two 
groups of countries: the ones who believe in the voluntarism and those who are sceptical 
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towards the voluntarism and see mandatory distribution of refugees as the only possible 
solution for the crisis. The sentence creates an impression to the reader that those 
countries which support the voluntarism approach (including Estonia) are doing right 
while the others need to be convinced in the accuracy of the voluntarism approach.  
The voluntary admittance of additional refugees: In one case, the MI contrasted those two 
groups of countries in the opposite way where the voluntary allocation of refugees was 
seen in a positive way. When commenting on the different opinions of countries which 
were addressed during the meeting of the MIs in June he commented about the countries 
to whom admitting refugees was not a problem: “They admit more refugees within a 
week than the number proposed by the EC for two years.”ix  
 
5.2.2. Conservative and liberal domestic opinion 
 
The political parties in Estonia: From the end of July the position of the government 
changed. If previously the opposition of Estonia and EC was prevalent, from now on 
contrasting occurred between other groups. The government drew attention to the need of 
rationalism, opposing it to the demagogy and rumours. For instance, when commenting 
on the aftermigration myth
10
, the MI said: “The story of the Pandora box cannot be taken 
very seriously. We all understand that one needs to tackle the roots of the crisis so that 
people do not have to escape their homes.”x (Postimees, nr 168-7462) In this case, the MI 
opposed the rumour about the Pandora box phenomenon regarding the refugees spread by 
EKRE which is taken by large part of the population as a fact and on the other hand, 
everybody else (kõik) whom he claimed to be the normative. However, since the 
conservative attitude towards refugees was shared by approximately 50% of the 
population (chapter two), this claim in its current form can create an impression to the 
reader who shares the conservative stand that the speaker (MI in this case) sees himself as 
the expert on the truth, who educates the population.  
                                                          
10
 The claim that the arrival of refugees will be followed with arrival of their relatives and family members 
which will end up in mass migration, mainly spread by right populist parties. 
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The municipalities of Estonia: In a similar case, the MI addressed after the meetings with 
the municipality leaders in Estonia: “There is too little information in the south of 
Estonia,”xi (Eesti Päevaleht 22.07, nr 139) comparing it with the north-east part of the 
country.  
In even a more direct form, the contrasting was present in the interview with the FM
11
 in 
Postimees on 09.09. She contrasted in her interview the following groups:  
1) Estonia and the Western-European countries: while commenting on the 
differences between the attitudes of the Estonian people and the Western-
Europeans she said: “What differs the public opinion of Estonia and those 
countries (meaning Finland, Germany and France) is that there people have much 
more humanity.”xii (Postimees, 209-7503) 
2) The responsible and the irresponsible politicians in Estonia: when commenting 
on where the polarization in the society comes from, she said: “We have a lot of 
irresponsible politicians – I am not going to say their names – who inflame hatred 
and hostility.”xiii 
3) The people who are hostile and solidariy with the reefugees: She commented 
on the polarization of the society regarding the opinions: “Everybody saw the corp 
of the three-year old boy. How could one say something bad about refugees after 
this? Who are those people?...I invite all people who think normally: express your 
opinion in the social media!”xiv  
On the one hand, she referred to the agents directly and made a clear and influential moral 
statement, while creating a role model for the people: to be more similar to the Western-
European humane people. On the other hand, the contrasting of the population in this case 
can turn out to be countereffective. Especially the words “people who think normally”xv, 
“irresponsible politicians who inflame hatred and hostility”xvi and “there people have 
                                                          
11
 Even though the text represented just one example, one can assume that it summaraized the position 




much more humanity”xvii express a normative position and can potentially increase the 
polarization among the people who are conservative towards the refugees and feel 
“unnormal” (see Darley 83: 20-33 on labelling people). 
 
5.2.3. Discourse of solidarity and unity 
 
Regarding EU, instead of contrasting the ministers used words of solidarity and unity 
with the EU during the second half of July, August, September and October. For 
example, the PM commented on the decision on the Second Implementation Package as 
following: “Europe can overcome this crisis, if we manage to stand united and support 
one another” (Tampere 11.09) or the MI commented on the possible future allocations of 
refugees on the EU level as following: “Fortunately we have very good relationships with 
our colleagues and we can talk directly and openly.”xviii (Postimees nr 204-7498) 
 
5.3. The agenda of the communication 
 
5.3.1. The quota system 
 
The consistency of communication: The pattern of the government´s communication was 
rather inconsistent: a position was formed in media or through a press release before or 
after the meetings of the ministers of the member states in the EU level – in this case 
there were articles and press releases with a minister´s position in three to four 
subsequential days, while in some days (after the allocation of refugees was decided 
between EU and Estonia) there was more than one article in one newspaper with a 
government´s position.  At the same time, a position was missing in between - even if 
after some events (for instance the misleading article in Spiegel about the 
disproportionally huge number of refugees being resettled to Estonia or the escalating 
crisis in the Central Europe) one could logically expect a position from a minister. Some 
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issues such as the quotas and the need to tackle the external causes of the crisis got 
proportionally more attention during the first months, while the mutual solidarity among 
the EU member states was a priority topic from the end of July.  
The concreteness of the positions: Often the position of the government was vague and 
ambiguous messages could be interpreted from the statements. For instance after the 
meeting of the EU MIs, the MI said to Eesti Päevaleht:  
“Estonia defended its position, that we do not support the mandatory quotas and we would like to 
find a solution, where one can contribute on a voluntary basis. However, for example Sweden has 
said that they do not have a problem with the numbers proposed by the EC…Thus each country 
has its own problems.”xix (Eesti Päevaleht 17.06, nr 116) 
Here one can see that on the one hand the MI made clear the Estonian position, but on the 
other hand also expressed the message that there were countries, which were on a 
different opinion. This can indicate that since the outcome of the negotiations was not yet 
clear, he wanted to leave all options open and thus illustrated also other (even if 
unpopular) outcomes. The positions became more concrete after certain important events 
(see chapter four), such as the fire in the Vao refugee centre in the beginning of 
September and the decision on the number of refugees being taken to Estonia in July and 
September.  
Maintaing the quotas low: The government mostly focused in the discussions on the 
distribution mechanism and the negotiations with the EC to lower or completely oppose 
the quotas and to express that the quota system is unfair for Estonia. For example, Rõivas 
said  on 10.06 regarding the distribution of refugees: “We are ready to help, but the 
method cannot be the order of Brussels.“xx (Eesti Päevaleht, 10.06, nr 111) He also added 
as following: “The suggestion is unfair for Estonia and we are not capable to cope with 
such a big number of people. The unproportionally big quotas create problems instead of 
solving them.“xxi (Postimees, nr 133 (7427)  
The need to maintain the quotas as low as possible also remained the main issue during 
June and July in the government´s positions. The ministers often mentioned that deciding 
on an exact number of refugees is not benefitial for Estonia. For instance, when talking 
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about the meeting of the EU MI-s in Brussls, the MI said: “I do not want to go to the 
European Council with an exact number. If we do have an exact number, we do not have 
space for negotiations.“xxii (Postimees, nr 135 (7429) 
Even though the government expressed clearly the position to be against the mandatory 
quotas, it also addressed readiness to participate in the resettlement programme if the 
quotas were proportional to the capabilities of Estonia. Also the need for resettlement on 
voluntary basis remained important. (GCU 27.05, Eesti Päevaleht 101, 110 etc) 
The position of the government regarding the exact number of refugees that Estonia 
would be ready to resettle, remained vague. The ministers in general expressed often 
vague and ambiguous positions. For instance, the PM expressed after the meeting with 
the EU heads of states at the end of June: “The exact number of refugees needs to be 
clarified yet.” (Postimees, nr 146-7440) At the same time the MI expressed that the 
vagueness among the opinions of the member states was a problem. After the meeting 
with the MIs from the other EU member states, he claimed: “No agreement was reached 
in the meeting of the MIs. The debate was rather vague, a big number of states did not say 
wheather they support the mandatory quotas.“xxiii (Postimees nr 139-7433) At the same 
time, the government itself did not specify, what is the number of refugees which is fair 
for Estonia and proportional for its size and capabilities. The MI explained it as 
following: “If we go there with an exact number, we will lock up ourselves and won´t 
have much flexibility.“xxiv (Postimees, nr 135 (7429) At the same time, it is evident that 
the flexibility is not the only reason why the ministers kept the exact number of the 
refugees vague. Since the positions of the Estonian ministers are in general rather 
moderate and aimed not to be too conflicting with the mainstream opinion on the EU 
level, the concern about the image of Estonia in the international level probably plays a 
role. This is also reflected in a statement of the MI on 28.05. He says about deciding on 
an exact number of refugees for the negotiations with the EC as following: “If we go to 
ask for a too small number it might make an impression of a fake solidarity.“xxv (Eesti 




5.3.2. Solidarity with the refugees and the EU 
 
Helping refugees outside of Estonia: In addition to the quotas, the need for solidarity was 
addressed also a couple of times already in April-May. The FM addressed the need to 
mutually solve the problems which emerge in Europe (SL Õhtuleht 28.05). Also, the PM 
called for, in addition to fighting for the reduction of the number of refugees to be 
resettled to Estonia, to understand the difficult situation of the refugees and the need to 
help them. “We also need to understand the situation of those people who have escaped 
the war or other horrors. Taking into acount our capabilities we have to be open to be part 
in finding a solution for the problem.“xxvi (Õhtuleht 10.06). However, expressing 
solidarity during the first months was rather an exception and was done to illustrate the 
position that relocation of refugees is not the only way to express solidarity with them. 
The utility discourse of refugees: A change occurred at the end of July, when the number 
of refugees to be resettled to Estonia was decided between the Estonian government and 
the EC (chapter 2.5). If previously the main position was to hold the number of refugees 
as low as possible and to fight for the best possible solution for Estonia, the position 
turned a lot more favorable for the resettlement of refugees. The government emphasized 
that the resettlement is a possibility rather than a responsibility for the municipalities of 
Estonia. For example the PM claimed after the first decision on the relocation of the 
refugees was made: “The message is still that this is part of the European solidarity and I 
see here a possibility for the municipalities, not a responsibility.“xxvii (Eesti Päevaleht 
21.07, nr 138)  
Disproving the rumours about refugees: Additionally, the government focused on 
disproving the threats regarding the immigration and the misconceptions, such as “the 
refugees will be all put into one place” (Postimees nr 169-7463, Eesti Päevaleht nr 139), 
the migration of the families of the resettled person afterwards (Postimees nr 168-7462), 
the big number of refugees (Eesti Päevaleht nr 138). For example when referring to the 
tour of the ministers around Estonia to explain how the relocation of the refugees works 
in practice and to reduce the threats among the population, the MI stated: “They come 
here to live somewhere in a flat, having their ordinary life.“xxviii (Postimees nr 169-7463) 
43 
 
Also the MI – refering to the demagogy of EKRE to compare the arrival of refugees with 
the Pandora´s box, calms down the public: “Talking about the Box of Pandora does not 
make much sense to me. Everybody understands that we need to tackle the core reasons 
of the crisis so that people do not have to come away.“xxix (Postimees nr 168-7462) The 
position of the government, thus,  had turned much more favorable towards the EU and 
critical towards the conservative groups of the country in its rhetorics. 
The unity of Europe: After the escalation of the refugee crisis in August, the need for an 
additional resettlement program was foreseen. The possibility for additional number of 
refugees being resettled to Estonia also remained the core issue of discussion in the 
media. (Postimees nr 195-7489, nr 204-7498, GCU 08.09 etc) However, the position of 
the government remained vague and the position of the EC was expected before Estonian 
government forms its own opinion (Postimees nr 205-7499). The PM stated that the unity 
of Europe was adressed as being the most important issue: “Europe is in crisis and there 
is not a prompt solution for it. In this situation the unity of Europe is critically important 
to fulfill a complex and long-term plan.”xxx (GCU 08.09)  
The responsibilities of Europe: In addition, the need to tackle the crisis in the countries of 
the origin of the refugees remained important. Commenting on the final decision on the 
Second Implementation Package, the PM stated: “EU has to, more than until now, tackle 
the core reasons in the countries of origin providing there the humanitarian aid, fighting 
with the human trafficking and participating in the peace keeping missions. The borders 
have to be brought under the control and one has to create the possibilities for the Syrian 
peace process.”xxxi (GCU 09.09) 
The European values and solidarity with refugees: After the fire in the Vao refugee centre 
(Appendix 4), solidarity with the refugees and the need to share the European values 
became a prevailing position. For example when talking with the residents of the Vao 
refugee centre after the fire, the PM clearly stated that the refugees are integral part of 
Estonia: “I heard the stories of the people living in the refugee centre and the joint part of 
their stories was escaping from the war, a dream about home and employment and the 
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fear of xenophobia…Nobody should feel unsafe in Estonia!”xxxii GCU 03.09) When 
commented on the sudden acceptance with the relocation programm, the PM said: 
“Estonia is part of Europe and the European values are typical for us,xxxiii (GCU 08.09) 
using the claim of identity to belong to the west rather than east in explaining the sudden 
move from conservative stand towards solidarity with the EU and the refugees. At the 
same time the PM also claimed that the discussions about if the relocation of refugees 
was right or wrong decision does not make sense anymore, stating that it is inevitable 
anyway and Estonia has to focus on the future: „Now is the time to show solidarity when 
the distribution formula is not a question anymore.”xxxiv (GCU 09.09) 
 
5.3.3. Other topics 
 
In the end of September, the main topics were about the additonal number of refugees 
being resettled to Estonia and the readiness of the society to accept them (GCU 16.09, 
24.09, Postimees nr 220-7514 etc), but also the need to help the war refugees closer to 
their homes (GCU 09.09, Postimees nr 205-7499). The need for the protection of the free 
movement of people and goods within EU was mentioned a couple of times (SL Õhtuleht 
01.10, Postimees nr 227-7521, Eesti Päevaleht nr 185).  
 
5.3.4. The absence of position 
 
One crucial issue in the communication of the government was the absence of the 
position. While the government reacted actively to the quota system and expressed 
solidarity with the EU countries and the refugees after the allocation of refugees was 
determined, some events where the government´s reaction would have been logical and 
necessary in order to provide adequate information in the case of rumours, the 
government did not express any position. This was the case with the initiative by the 
Estonian Human Rights Center to the Estonian society to express solidarity with the 
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refugees in late April (nr 99 – 7393), the misleading information about the plan to 
construct a new refugee centre to the Vägeva village (SL Õhtuleht 25.09), the idea that a 
country can participate in the refugee resettlement program with financial aid rather than 
the resettlement itself (SL Õhtuleht 10.09) etc. The government in those cases did neither 
confirm nor disprove those statements – in some cases the members of the Estonian 
Refugee Council commented on the claims, thus the government probably did not see it 
necessary to additionally make a statement, however the lack of response can also 
illustrate the general pattern of the government´s communication in the crisis: to form a 
position as little as possible and as much as necessary. When Postimees referred to the 
misleading article of “The Spiegel” on May twenty-six (Postimees nr 120-7414), which 
stated that Estonia has to admit more than 10 000 refugees and which turned out to be a 
test calculation, the FM and the MI formed a position in media about the need to 
participate in helping to find a solution in the crisis (Eesti Päevaleht 101, SL Õhtuleht 
28.05), however, there was no clear reference to the Spiegel article nor an attempt to 
disprove the number or comment on it. The clarification was given from the Estonian 
Refugee Council (Postimees nr 121-7415) instead of the GCU or through a direct position 
in media through the PM or the MI. The formation of a position by the government in 
those cases would, however, have been crucial in order to prevent the spread of rumours 
and misconceptions. 
 
5.4. The creating and maintaining forces of the crisis 
 
The opinions regarding the main reasons which created and are involved in the 
maintenance of the refugee crisis varied among the ministers in the government. While 
the FM stated clearly that the European countries cannot be blamed in the maintenance of 
the crisis, the MI also saw fault in the Southern-European crisis. The PM avoided 




5.4.1. Fighting with the core reasons of the crisis 
 
As already mentioned in point one, one of the main arguments of the government was the 
need to fight with the core reasons of the crisis. In most of the articles, which mentioned 
the reasons of the crisis, the invasion of ISIS in Syria and Iraq was mentioned as the core 
reason of the crisis (GCU 08.09, 09.09, 24.09 etc). The FM pointed out already shortly 
after the shipwreck in Lampedusa (Eesti Päevaleht nr 79), that it would be wrong to 
blame the other European countries in the crisis and that every country should contributes 
to solving the crisis. She also added that the instable situation in Libya, the activities of 
the human smugglers and the uncontrolled borders of EU remain a problem. Also, the PM 
addressed the human smugglers to be one of the core problems of the crisis (Postimees nr 
133-7427). The MI also saw some responsibility in other EU member states, especially 




Alternatively, the domestic policy, especially the scaremongering among “one political 
party” (referred to as EKRE) was seen as a problem to hinder the management of the 
crisis, especially during the end of July when the first allocation of refugees to Estonia 
was decided. For example after claiming that 1064 refugees is too big number for 
Estonia, the PM also opposed the demagogy of EKRE and called for rationalism: “I also 
find irresponsible if one Parliament party spreads the hysteria about the approaching mass 
migration in Riigikogu. This is unacceptable – we will definitely not have a mass 
migration.“xxxv (SL Õhtuleht 10.06). Similar positions were reflected through other 
interviews with the PM and the MI, which is driven by the increasing polarization in the 







In addition to the conventional reasons of the crisis, some unconventional issues were 
also pointed out. Russia was mentioned as a threat in the crisis once. The MI claimed: 
“Russia has not given the mandate for the UN that far, which the latter has applied for in 
order to intervene in Syria. We can only imagine why Russia has vetoed it.“xxxvi 
(Postimees nr 205-7499). 
             
5.4.4. The information shadowing 
 
 As refered to in the previous chapter, the absence of the government´s position was an 
underlying issue regarding the communication in topics where the formation of the 
position by the government would have been not only logical, but important in order to 
avoid the spread of rumours in the society. The ministers (the MI), however, did refer to 
the expectation of a more comprehensive communication through media only once. After 
the Second Implementation Package was decided, the MI explained the additional 
number of refugees being relocated to Estonia as following: “If Junkcer came out with his 
plan in spring, the situation was all not that bad yet. Only in August, 112 000 refugees 
came to EU. Even the EC did not expect so rapid escalation of the situation.“xxxvii (Eesti 
Päevaleht nr 173). This is the time, when the government had changed its hostile position 
regarding the quota system and had to explain the sudden decision for the allocation of 
refugees to the domestic audience.  
 
5.4.5. The European Commission 
 
In addition to directly referring to some actors, who cause and maintain the crisis, the EC 
was referred to indirectly in many cases to mismanage the crisis or causing additional 
problems. For example the PM when expressing the unfair quotas for Estonia said: “The 
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unproportionally big quotas create problems instead of solving them.“xxxviii (Postimees 
133-7427) The disproportionally big number of refugees proposed on Estonia was seen as 
unfair and rather being counterproductive, since it increases the cleavage in the society. 
According to the PM “The unproportionally big quotas create opposition even in those 
people who otherwise would be ready to help the refugees.“xxxix (Postimees 133-7427) 
 
5.5. The moral judgement of the crisis 
 
As already pointed out, the general attitude of the Estonian government was to express an 
existence of a moral duty for participating in solving the refugee crisis on the basis of 
solidarity with the other EU member states as far as this does not harm the interests of 
Estonia, mainly if the quotas proposed by the EC are not too harsh for the country. 
However, the moral judgement about the need to help the other EU member states in 
sharing the burden in solving the crisis such as the need to express solidarity with the 
refugees in the crisis and the actual practical solutions proposed by the government were 
often contradicting each other.  
 
5.5.1. Expressing ambiguity 
 
Expectation to form an opinion: After the shipwreck in Lampedusa, there was no 
immediate response on the tragedy by the government in media. Already within the first 
days after the shipwreck, many European heads of states expressed their opinion and 
formed a moral position, which were refered to also in the Estonian media (Postimees nr 
95-7389). Additionally, at the end of April, the head of the Estonian Human Rights 
Center formed a position in media and called for mutual solidarity with the refugees 
(Postimees nr 99-7393). However, this did not meet with a government response to form 
an unambiguous position stating the moral responsibilities of Estonia in the crisis. At the 
same time, there was an expectation for the government to form a clear position from the 
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other political parties. The oppositional Central Party for instance initiated the 
government to form a clearer position (Postimees nr 122-7416).   
 
5.5.2. Helping refugees without allocation 
 
The PM gave an ambiguous position on 22/04/2015: “Estonia has not supported the 
quotas in order to allocate the refugees between the member states. However, when 
looking at the world´s crisis in a broader sense and the Estonian position, we decided to 
help in the Ukranian crisis and to give asylum.“xl (Eesti Päevaleht nr 77). Thus, one can 
see that on the one hand the PM expressed the Estonian position until then of not 
supporting the quota system, on the other hand pointing out that exceptions are possible 
and leaving both options open. Two days later, the FM formed a more concrete moral 
stand, which expressed more compassion with the refugees and called to see real people 
behind each number: “Talking about the subsequent horrible tragedy which happened on 
the Mediterranian sea, the numbers are used: 28 saved, more than 800 drowned. There is 
real person behind each number. Terrified person. Someone fleeing the violence. A 
desperate person.”xli (Eesti Päevaleht 24.04, nr 79)  
Thus one can see that the position of the FM was aimed to induce sympathy in the reader 
and express the Estonian moral responsibility to help in the crisis, however the following 
is more ambiguous. Talking about wheather the countries which carry bigger burden in 
the crisis need to be helped out, she stated: “Helping the countries which carry too big 
burden – this needs further analysis yet...It is true that some countries carry 
unproportionally big burden...of course one has to find ways to support those 
countries...this is our common concern, which applies to all European countries 
regardless of their geographic location...however, sometimes it turns out from the media 
coverage, that the so-called allocation of the refugees on solidarity basis is really the main 
solution for the crisis..””xlii (Eesti Päevaleht 24.04, nr 79) 
One the one hand, the FM claimed that every country regardless of their location has to 
help in the crisis, at the same time, she did not state clearly that sharing the burden with 
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the allocation system was the best solution. The position of the PM was even more 
ambiguous – while stating the previous experience of Estonia of not participating in the 
allocation system, he also left open the possibility to do so in the future. Thus, there was 
no clear unambiguous statement and the reader might be rather confused in what the 
ministers want to say exactly. 
 
5.5.3. Solidarity with the refugees and the EU 
 
After reaching an agreement about the number of refugees to be resettled to Estonia 
between the Estonian government and the EC in July, the position of the government took 
a more concrete form. If previously only the FM formed some moral position on the crisis 
and even then it was rather ambiguous, from the second half of July the position of the 
PM and the MI, which previously had been ambiguous, expressed now more concretely 
solidarity with the refugees: similar positions that the Western-European heads of states 
(especially the position of the German Chancellor Angela Merkel and the position of the 
French president Francois Hollande). 
Already on 22/07/2015, after the decision about the exact number of refugees to be 
resettled to Estonia was decided, the PM expressed: “Estonian society and authorities 
have the necessary capacity to integrate refugees. How well they will manage in our 
country depends on whether or not we are willing to give them a chance.” (GCU 20.07). 
The media announced the exact number of refugees, which were to be resettled to Estonia 
on 21/07/2015 (Postimees nr 166-7460). The MI, expressed the day later about the 
decision with the EC about the allocation of refugees to Estonia: “I do not want you to 
take it as a responsibility but so that you can show solidarity with Europe.“xliii (Postimees 
nr 167 -7461). For a reader this sends out confusing messages: if during the previous 
months the government ministers had clearly expressed that the quota system was unfair 
for Estonia and the country should rather find alternative ways to help in the crisis, after 
the agreement had been reached with the EC about the allocation of refugees, the sudden 
position was that Estonia has the capability to integrate refugees and this should be an 
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opportunity for Estonia. The sudden change in the position makes an impression that the 
government´s initial ambiguous position was driven by the attempt to, on the one hand, 
not irritate the conservative domestic reader while sending out messages that the quota 
system is unfair for Estonia. On the other hand, while understanding that the 
government´s hands are tied (see Pierson, chapter three) and the allocation of refugees 
might be inevitable at the end, it is logical that the ministers sended out messages which 
talk about the solidarity with the other member states and leave the allocation option 
open.  
Integrity of refugees with the Estonian people: During the next events, the driving forces 
for the government to form a moral judgement about the crisis seemed to be the fire in the 
Vao refugee centre at the beginning of September and the escalation of the crisis during 
August and September. After the fire in Vao, the PM expressed clearly sympathy with the 
residents of the Vao refugee center, stating: “Nobody should feel fear in Estonia.”xliv 
(GCU 03.09). This statement expresses that the refugees are seen an integral part of 
Estonia.  
Solidarity with EU: Regarding the escalation of the crisis and the discussions around the 
additional resettlement programme of the refugees, the moral position of the government 
was firm. When answering to the question of the journalist, whether Estonia can refuse 
admitting refugees on its territory, the PM claimed: “Definitely Estonia cannot close its 
eyes for the people who are in trouble and to be solely the consumer of solidarity. The EU 
is not only a wallet, but first of all a union based on values. Taking into account our 
capabilities we can and have to help.”xlv (Eesti Päevaleht nr 174). The latter statement 
defines clearly that EU is built on values and Estonian role is to look further from one´s 
own benefits and to help in the crisis, meaning here that allocation of refugees is seen as a 
natural action. In addition to advertising the solidarity to the domestic audience, the PM 
also expresses the European unity now when meeting with its European partners. For 
example, when meeting with the PM of Latvia, the PM of Estonia introduces the Estonian  
position on solidarity: “Europe can overcome this crisis, if we manage to stand united and 
support one another. It is important that all member states contribute proportionally to 
their size. European solidarity is not a one-way street.” (GCU, 11.09) Thus, the European 
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values and the unity of Europe had become an important moral issue in the rhetoric of the 
government, which replaced the previous voluntarism approach. 
 
5.6. Solutions for the crisis 
 
Similarly as avoiding to take a clear moral position about the crisis at the beginning of the 
analysis period (from April to July), the government also took an ambiguous position 
about how to tackle the crisis until the end of July. As already seen, the PM gave an 
ambiguous position at the end of April, stating that Estonia should find a balanced 
compromise with the EC how to tackle the situation and that Estonia had not supported 
the mandatory quotas of the EC that far (Eesti Päevaleht nr 77). However, he also gave an 
example about how Estonia had given asylum to the Ukranian refugees during the crisis. 
The position did not include a clear stand and sent out various messages: on the one hand 
Estonian hostility towards the quotas, on the other hand its previous practice to give 
asylum to the Ukrainian refugees.  
The FM offered more clear position regarding the solutions to tackle the crisis already 
from the very beginning. According to her, the most important methods were defending 
the borders of the EU collectively, finding a sustainable solution in Libya and fighting 
against human trafficking on the Mediterranian Sea (Eesti Päevaleht nr 79).  
 
5.6.1. Opposition to the quota system 
 
Incohesion between three government parties: Some position was formed by the end of 
May (Päevaleht nr 101), when the three governing parties (Reform Party, SDP and IRL) 
agreed that Estonia has to help the refugees in some way, however, the contribution of the 
state differed among the three parties. The position of IRL was the most conservative, 
opposing the allocation of refugees completely. A leading politician Margus Tsahkna 
from IRL commented about the contribution of Estonia in tackling the crisis as following: 
“How many refugees will we take, this has to be voluntary. There are methods agreed on 
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the EU-level how to solve the crisis. This does not have to be the resettlement of the 
refugees….We have joined the EU based on the treaties and if some duties will be pushed 
on us now based on the qualified majority method – that would definitely be a 
precedent.”xlvi  The Reform Party was more moderate in its position. The MI explained it 
as following: “The Estonian position in the EC should be that the quotas are not suitable 
for Estonia, but on the voluntary basis we can accept that Italy and Greece need our help 
in the current situation. We have to be based on our current capability to admit refugees. 
This year it is very limited.”xlvii The SDP at the same time was the most favorable towards 
the EC proposal.  The head of SDP Sven Mikser explained the position of the party as 
following: “Estonia has to help the refugees and to take into account the suggestions of 
the EC and the capabilities of the country when admitting them.”xlviii In addition to that, 
all government parties agreed that an effort should be made to tackle the core reasons of 
the crisis: the war in the Middle-East, the human smugglers and the uncontrolled borders 
of the EU.  
So, one can see a clear division between the government parties regarding the 
contribution of Estonia in tackling the crisis and finding a solution to it: IRL being the 
most conservative and opposing the relocation of refugees completely, SDP being in 
favor of the relocation and the suggestions of the EC, but also taking into account the 
Estonian capability to admit them and the Reform Party somewhere in the middle, 
opposing the quotas to be mandatory, but being ready to help on the voluntary basis. 
The unfairness of the quotas: Also, during June, the position of the government had not 
changed and the main discussion went around the quotas. The PM saw the quotas not 
helping in solving the crisis but rather deepening it, since it would create a cleavage 
within the Estonian society. He commented on the quota system proposed by the EC as 
following: “The proposal is unfair for Estonia and we are not capable to cope with such a 
big number of people. Unproportionally big quotas create problems, not solve them.”xlix 
(Postimees nr 133-7427). The MI also adressed the same solutions already pointed out 
during the previous months in April and May: “One has to deepen the civil- and military 
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cooperation. One should focus on the core reasons of the crisis, which means the actions 
in the third countries, where the refugees are coming from.”l(SL Õhtuleht 10.06).  
 
5.6.2. Resettlement of refugees  
 
Similarily like in the case of forming a clearer moral position about the crisis from the 
end of July, the government also changed its position regarding how to tackle the crisis in 
most efficient way.  
Additional resettlement programs: If previously the main position was to keep the quotas 
for Estonia as low as possible and fight with the core reasons of the crisis, the 
resettlement as an important measure to tackle the crisis had increased its importance. 
The MI mentioned the need for a new resettlement program, where also Estonia would 
have its part (Postimees nr 204-7498). He also admitted that Estonia would have the 
capability to admit more refugees: “If the proposal of the EC is 100 000, then we can take 
into account that this is an extra 200 people.”li (Postimees nr 205-7499) At the same time 
he also defended the old position that Estonia has to keep the quotas in the range that they 
suit the capabilities of Estonia: “...and we are not under pressure if our arguments are 
right...Fortunately we have good relationships with our colleagues and we can talk openly 
and directly.“lii In this way it looks like the ministers on the one hand, defends the 
position of the EC seeing it as inevitable that an additional number of refugees will be 
allocated to Estonia (and possibly keeping the way open for future allocations, thus not 
setting certain limits), but at the same time, coming back with the old argument to find a 
suitable option for Estonia while keeping the quotas low.  
Calming down the local authoroties: In addition to the quota system, the ministers also 
calmed down the local authoroties, claiming that the government will help them with the 
allocation of refugees. According to the MI “The country will help the local 




5.6.3. European unity 
 
The PM adressed even more clearly that Estonia as being part of Europe and sharing 
European values has to help in the resettlement, while he put the European integrity as 
more important than the number of refugees being resettled to Estonia (5.3. 1); GCU 
09.09). At the same time, the need to tackle the core reasons of the problems in the origin 
countries of the refugees and the EU to act unanimously were pointed out. When talking 
about the meeting of the EU heads of states in Brussels at the end of May, the PM 
claimed: “Resolving the refugee crisis will not happen quickly or easily but if we work on 
it together, with conscientiousness and solidarity, we can begin to alleviate the situation”. 
(GCU 24.09) 
 
5.7. The usage of interdiscursivity/intertextuality12 
 
5.7.1. Reference to different agents 
 
European Comission: The most frequently the government refered directly to the EC or 
Brussels – in approximately half of the cases when some actor was refered to. (Eesti 
Päevaleht nr 111 etc). When opposing the position of the Commission in terms of the 
mandatory quotas, the government also refered to other texts such as the founding 
documents of the EU (5.3.; Eesti Päevaleht nr 101), while the main idea in this case was 
to illustrate the logic behind opposing the mandatory quotas.  
Domestic politics: The government also refered to the domestic conservative party 
EKRE, warning that frightening with the refugee-threat is counterproductive. EKRE is 
not directly mentioned, but it was clear whom is the government talking about (Postimees 
nr 146 -7440). In some other cases the government referred to misconceptions and 
rumours about the refugee crisis, which need to be disproved. For instance “the 
                                                          
12
 Refering to (either directly or indirectly) to other texts via the given text. 
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aftermigration is a big myth that is spread” (Postimees nr 168-7462). The distributor of 
the rumour was EKRE in this case again. 
 
 
5.7.2. Presence of discourses 
 
Solidarity: Throughout the positions of the government, the most common prevailing 
discourse was the solidarity discourse
13
, which was becoming stronger when the crisis 
escalated and the resettlement of the refugees to Estonia became sure. The ministers 
refered to similar positions as the Western European heads of states for example drawing 
parallels with the refugee status of Europeans in the history (SL Õhtuleht 28.04) or the 
need to understand the difficulties of the people who escape the war, when the PM stated: 
“We also need to understand the destiny of those people, who have escaped the war and 
other horrors.”liv (SL Õhtuleht 10.06). The MI also refered to the proportionally small 
number of refugees being resettled to Europe compared to countries, which are close to 
Syria, which was also one of the main argument used by the Western European ministers: 
“In Lebanon 4.5. million people have to cope with 1.5 million refugees. In EU lives 500 
million people and right now the helping of 100 000-160 000 refugees is speculated. In 
this light, to help 160 000 people compared to 500 million...”lv The need to show 
solidarity among EU member states (GCU 09.09, Tampere 11.09) and the tradition to 
solve problems in EU via negotiations and compromises (Eesti Päevaleht nr 174) was 
also present. Those positions were reflected after the meetings of the Estonian ministers 
with their European colleagues and can be assumed the solidarity discourse came from 
the Western European countries. Although other stakeholders, such as the Estonian 
diaspora abroad, the employers in Estonia and the Human Rights Organisations expressed 
their opinions through media, the government in most cases did not refer to them directly.  
                                                          
13
 Adressing solidarity with the refugees and the other EU member states. 
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Utility: The position, which was reflected often by the employers, that the refugees can be 
benefitial for  Estonia, were sometimes reflected through the positions of the government. 
(5.3.; Postimees nr 167-7461), representing the so-called utility discourse.
14
 The increase 
of the utility discourse in media was also mentioned by Marit Valk (Valk 2015: 78) The 
PM explained the arrival of refugees as a possibility for the municipalities to express 
solidarity with Europe, however, it seems likely that it actually meant possibility in 
broader sense, since the negotiations with the municipalities were based on wheather 
particular municipalities have vacant jobs or not and the possibility to deal with the 
shortage of labour was present in the public discussions. In one case, the PM also directly 
mentioned the employers and drew a direct parallel with the population problems of 
Estonia: “Several businesses have declared their readiness to offer employment to the 
refugees as soon as they arrive in Estonia," Rõivas said, adding that this strengthens his 
faith that Estonian society can adequately deal with the migrant crisis. "The government 
aims to ensure that the ratio of public to private employment corresponds to the changes 
in the working-age population of Estonia." (GCU 16.09) As the shrinking population has 
been a popular topic in public discussions already for longer time, it is likely that this 
plays also a role in the perception of the migration trends in broader sense and the 
enterprises which are in need of labour play a role here as well.  
More generally, since all of the formentioned stakeholders adressed the need to express 
solidarity with the refugees and this became also the dominant position of the government 
at the end of the summer, one can assume that those positions in addition to the pressure 
from the EC played some role in shaping the government´s position into more solidary 
direction. 
 
                                                          
14
 The claim that the refugees are economically benefitial for Estonia. 
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5.8. The cohesion of the opinions presented in the text 
 
5.8.1. Among the government parties 
 
As already seen in chapter 5.3, the ministers within the government presented different 
opinions regarding the crisis at the first half of the analysis period. While the SDP was 
the most favorable towards the refugees and IRL the most conservative, the Reform Party 
maintained a middle stand. This can be probably a cause of the Reform Party to lie more 
in the middle in the political spectrum but also the Reform Party to be the party of the 
PM, while the PM is expected to balance opinions within the government. From the end 
of July, when the allocation of refugees was decided, the positions of the three 
government parties also inevitably changed and became closer to each other. IRL which 
previously had opposed the quota system as whole, had to now adjust its position to the 
changed situation, however it still maintained the most cautious line. Tsahkna 
summarized the position of the party as following: “We live in an open world and all this 
which is present in Europe sooner or later also reaches to Estonia. Thus, we have the duty 
to first discuss the problems related to immigration first among ourselves and if needed, 
also to establish necessary rules.”lvi (Postimees nr 195-7489)  
 
5.8.2. Among the ministers 
 
What applies to the Reform Party, the opinions between the ministers varied remarkably. 
The MI maintained the most conservative line. Even though, his positions also expressed 
more solidarity compared to the beginning of summer, he remained quite critical about 
the possible additional allocations in the future. For example, when commenting on the 
upcoming meeting of the EU MIs: he claimed “I really hope that the EC will not come 
back again with such a position which is already rejected by the heads of states.”lvii 
(Postimees nr 205-7499) At the same time, the FMs (both Pentus-Rosimannus and 
Kaljurand) were more open for even bigger solidarity with the refugees. When Pentus-
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Rosimannus expressed already in April the need to be more humane in perceiving the 
crisis (chapter 5.3; Eesti Päevaleht 24.04, nr 79), Kaljurand expressed that unlike the MI, 
she would see the distribution mechanism of refugees as more flexible. When 
commenting on the claim of the MI that Estonia has a limit in the number of refugees it 
can admit, Kaljurand claimed: “For sure the MI is acknowledgeable to say that. However, 
I cannot exclude the possibility that also we can have one day the case when we need to 

















6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
As a general conclusion, it turned out from the analysis that the government´s 
communication can be divided into two periods: the first period from the end of April 
until the end of July when the main topic was the allocation of refugees between the 
member states and the negotiations with the EC regarding the mandatory quota system. 
The position of the government  was to oppose the obligatory distribution between the 
member states and to stand for voluntarism regarding the solidarity with the refugees. At 
the same time, the need to tackle the crisis somehow was addressed, while all ministers 
agreed that Estonia does not have the capability to allocate the initial number of refugees 
proposed by the EC (1064). At the same time, the opinions within the ministers were not 
coherent and they sent out ambiguous and confusing messages. If the FM Pentus-
Rosimannus addressed more the humane dimension of the crisis, the MI and the PM 
mainly focused on the numbers and how to convince the EC that the quotas for Estonia 
are unfair. In this regard, they identified the Estonian position with the position of other 
Central and Eastern European countries, while the role of the government was seen to 
convince the sceptical Western-European countries in the accuracy of the Estonian 
position. Meanwhile, the MI and the PM also sent out messages, which took the Western 
European countries as examples in participating more into solidarity as was proposed by 
the EC. At the same time, it was visible that the sentences expressed uncertainty while 
sending out ambiguous messages. From the end of July - after the first number of 
refugees to be sent to Estonia was clear - there occurred a change in the communication 
patterns. The sentences expressed more confidence and instead of opposing Estonian and 
EU position, expressed the unity and solidarity of the European countries, seeing the 
European solution as the only feasible one. Although the refugees were depicted as 
victims of war and innocent sufferers also before the end of July, the solidarity with the 
refugees increased after the number of refugees being resettled to Estonia was clear. After 
the fire in Vao, the PM sent out unambiguous messages while declaring that the refugees 
are an integral part of Estonia. Instead, opposing the irresponsible politicians (mainly 
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EKRE), people who are hostile with refugees and the difference between Estonian people 
and humane Western European people occurred. The ministers called people for 
rationalism, opposing the scaremongering and the rumours in the society and defining 
what is the normative opinion.  
The analysis revealed a few important aspects which are relevant regarding the possible 
societal impact of the communication.  
1) The ministers did not react to many of the events (including media events) which 
would have needed comments from the government such as the misleading article 
of Spiegel about the allocation of 10,000 refugees to Estonia, the construction of 
refugee centre to Vägeva etc. The ministers formed an official position when there 
was an important meeting on the EU level. Only the fire in Vao refugee centre 
resulted in the reaction from the government, other events which happened on EU 
level and could have been commented also by ministers, were not. At the same 
time, the opposition parties, human rights organisations, Estonian diaspora, 
employers and other interest groups took the role in commenting on those events 
and thus provoking the media discussion. For the public, this can send out a 
message that the government forms positions only when some new decision is 
made on the EU level and the government itself has no strong personal agenda.  
2) The ministers changed their position suddenly: while during the first months, the 
leading position of the ministers was to oppose the mandatory quotas and to 
convince the EU in the accuracy of the voluntarism, the position changed after the 
First Implementation Package was agreed on. Although the ministers claimed that 
a good solution was reached for Estonia, the MI and the FM claimed later that 
apermanent allocation mechanism can happen. At the same time, strongly 
emphasizing on the European solidarity and contrasting people inside Estonian 
society, while labeling which is the normative action actually probably increases 
the cleavages in the society. (see Darley on labelling: 83: 20-33) On the one hand, 
it is logical that the crisis escalated quickly throughout the year and thus nobody 
could expect in April which methods are needed in September to tackle the crisis. 
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It is also probable that the government understood in July that since the allocation 
of refugees to Estonia is inevitable, addressing the solidarity would be more 
productive in order to reduce the tensions in the society. On the other hand, one 
can also speculate that the sudden change in the position and the contrasting 
manner in communication can induce more distrust towards the government and 
increase the polarization further, since part of the people feel not corresponding to 
the normative. At the same time, the communication of the government can create 
an impression that the solidarity is imposed by EU and the government solely 
follows the more influential European solidarity discourse, which supports the 
Habermas´s theory (Habermas 1991) of the state as an advocate of interest groups. 
3) The incohesion of the opinions inside the government probably hindered forming 
a strong position and being an influential role model in the society. As already 
seen, the opinions of the three government parties differed. While all three parties 
eventually agreed on the allocation system, the differences of opinions existed 
also between ministers inside one political party (Pevkur, Kaljurand). At the same 
time, the political scandals, the increase of the right wing party EKRE and the 
shrinking popularity of the government parties probably also contributed to the 
week position. Even though the ministers started being more proactive in the 
communication from the end of July (taking as an example the tour around 
Estonia by the MI and the MSA) to introduce to the municipalities the allocation 
system of refugees and to decrease the threats, one can assume that this is already 
the time when the cleavage in the society had increased and providing accurate 
information, as well as forming concrete and strong positions, one could argue, 
would have been needed earlier when the allocation of refugees was already 
forseen, even if not certain.  
As a general conslusion one can argue that the government had a rather week role in 
shifting the public communication, being in an expectant position, waiting for the final 
decision from the EU level. If some positions were sent out, they were rather ambiguous 
and confusing and did not probably convince the reader. If Pierson (2004) claimed that 
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the aim of the government in a modern state is to mediate between different stakeholders 
one can claim that the Estonian government did so up to certain extent, but this was rather 
marginal and not persistent. From the end of July, however (some signs already showed 
that from the end of June), the government had taken much more proactive role in 
supporting the European solidarity while for a reader this can create an impression that 
the solidarity is an interest which originates from the Western European states and was 
solely tried to be sold off to the Estonian population. This can support the argument of 
Pierson (2004) that the hands of the governments in regard of immigration are tied and 
the main decisions are made outside the country – this is certainly the case regarding the 
allocation of refugees since the decisions are made on the EU level and once decided, the 
national governments have to implement them while explaining to the domestic audience 
the necessity of such solution. Although the allocation of refugees, decided in the 
European Council on 20/07 needed a consensus of all member states (EU-2015/1601), 
there was inevitably pressure from the Western European states to change the sceptical 
opinion of the Central-Eastern European states, which was evident during the negotiation 
process. In this case one can argue that the Estonian government who was critical at first 
regarding the quota system, agreed with it since the opposition to it would have been with 
too high cost – for example the references of the Western-European heads of states to the 
possible collapse of the Schengen system were highly anticipated options by the Estonian 
government. (Tampere 23.09) Thus, it is logical that the Estonian state accepted the 
allocation of refugees as a less costly option as would be other alternatives (worsening the 
relations with the Western European partners, the collapse of the Schengen system etc). 
At the same, the analysis revealed an accuracy of the the theory of Habermas (1991), 
namely that the government tried to sell off the interest of EU (primarily the Western 
European states) while creating an impression that this was the public interest – weather 
the Western European states convinced the Estonian politicians in it or accepting this 
conception was just inevitable outcome. This can be seen when looking at the dynamics 
of the communication where the initial hostility towards the allocation system changed 
when the decision about allocation was made on the EU level at the end of July, when the 
position of the ministers turned a lot more favorable towards solidarity, while the possible 
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additional allocation was mentioned as a feasible option even by more conservative 
ministers such as the MI. (Postimees nr 205-7499) This indicates that the positions which 
in April-May would have seemed radical, turned to be favored arguments by the ministers 
in the perception of solutions for the crisis, while the change of the position clearly 
correlated in this sense with the decision about the allocation.  
At the same time, what applies to the communication of the government during the first 
months, one can argue that the ministers were rather entrapped with the conservative 
public opinion and tried to appeal to it, while at the same time, cautiously also addressing 
the solidarity. One can also speculate that this was probably aimed by leaving all options 
open while balancing the confronting interests in some way. In general, however, the 
government was relatively inactive during the first months and  one can assume that the 
lack of information facilitated the spread of rumours and misconceptions in the society 
and increased the cleavage which in a later face is harder to overcome. In addition, since 
the government´s main position during the first months was to oppose the quota system, 
the contrasting of the oponents of the quota system in the later phase is most probably 
countereffective and might increase the distrust with the government and the allocation 













The present MA thesis analysed the public communication of the Estonian government 
regarding the refugee crisis during the period 19/04-06/10 2015. The positions of the 
Foreign Minister, the Minister of the Interior and the Prime Minister in the government 
press releases and the most read daily newspapers in Estonia were taken into 
consideration. 
Taking into account the research questions, the analysis revealed the following: 
1)  The main triggering forces for the government to form a public position were the 
decisions of the meetings on the EU level, while other events – such as media events or 
other crucial events which triggered public discussion got a reaction from the government 
only in exceptional cases (one of such example was the fire in the Vao refugee centre). 
2) The communication from April until the end of July was infrequent and the moral 
position of the government was rather week. The main position of all the three ministers 
was to oppose the mandatory quota system and the need to convince the European 
Commission in the accuracy of the voluntarism. From the end of July, the position 
changed and solidarity was addressed with EU and the refugees. The ministers contrasted 
from the end of July the conservative and the liberal population, responsible and 
irresponsible politicians, Estonia and the Western European countries. The moral 
position, which previously was to help the refugees without allocation, turned in favour 
of the allocation and addressed the integrity of people in the Estonian society regardless 
of their background. The change in the discourse can be attributed to the fact that the 
government´s hands are tied regarding the immigration, supporting the immigration 
theory of Pierson (2004). The government most likely took over the more influential EU 
discourse and advertised it to the domestic audience, supporting the modern state 
functions theory of Habermas (1991).   
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3) The communication of the government was inconsistent during the first months – 
around the meetings of the ministers on the EU level, there were several articles/press 
releases in three to four subsequential days while in between there were periods when 
there was no article/press release for several weeks. From the end of July the 
communication was more consistent, however, this is probably due to the fact that there 
were more regular meetings on the EU level and the crisis itself had escalated. 
4) It can be speculate that the initial passivness of the communication was due to the 
uncertainty in the society – the government was in an expectant positions and did not 
want to take an active role before the allocation of refugees was certain. From the end of 
July, the allocation was certain and possible future allocations were forseen, thus the 
government acted based on the current situation and took more active role in the public 
communication.  
In general one can say that the government´s initial passive role in the communication 
turned active in the middle of the summer and this can be attributed to the fining of the 
allocation on the EU level. However, one can speculate that taking a more active role in 
the communication from the beginning would have prevented the spread of 
misconceptions in the society and would have facilitated the later explanation of the 
allocation of refugees to Estonia for the domestic audience. An additional value for the 
future research would be to comparatively analyse the self-interpretation of the 
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08.09.2015 
Vaher, H. “Rõivas: Eesti on valmis Euroopa rändekriisi lahendamisse solidaarselt 
panustama,” 09.09.2015 
Tampere, A. “Prime Ministers of Estonia and Latvia discuss Junker’s proposals to solve 
European Migrant Crisis,” 11.09.2015 
“Prime Minister Rõivas to employers: I appreciate your contribution towards solving the 
migrant crisis” (GCU), 16.09.2015 
“Peaminister Rõivas Jean-Claude Junckerile: Euroopa Liit peab rohkem tegema Süüria 
naabruses” (GCU), 16.09.2015 
Tampere, A. “Prime Minister Rõivas: The EU must support the neighbouring countries of 
Syria to reduce the migration pressure on Europe,” 23.09.2015 
Tampere, A. “Prime Minister Rõivas in Brussels: European Council achieved consensus 
on next steps in solving migrant crisis,” 24.09.2015 
“Prime Minister Rõivas: Luxembourg’s EU Presidency has done a good job during the 








Refugee crisis timeline 
19/04/2015 – A ship with more than 800 migrants drowns near the island of Lampedusa 
in the Mediterranian Sea 
20/04/2015 – European Commission proposed a 10-point plan to tackle the crisis 
23/04/2015 – Emergency Summit of EU heads of states 
30/04/2015 – The head of the Estonian Human Rights Centre Kari Käsper calls for 
solidarity with the refugees in media 
26/05/2015 – “The Spiege” publishes a test calculation of the European Commission 
which states that Estonia has to resettle over 10,000 refugees on its territory, which 
spreads in Estonian media distorted as “Estonia has to take 10,000 refugees” 
16/06/2015 – The meeting of the EU Ministers of the Interior regarding the refugee crisis 
27/05/2015 - The European Commission agrees on the First Implementaion Pact on the 
distribution of the refugees among the EU member states. The Estonian share is 1064 
according to the plan. 
26-27/06/2015 – The European Council meeting regarding the refugee crisis 
09/06/2015 – The Estonian government decided not to agree with the resettlement plan 
proposed by the European Commission 
13/07/2015 – The Hungarian Government announces that the country starts erecting a 




20/07/2015 – The EU member states reach to an agreement with the European 
Commission regarding the number of the refugees to be resettled among the Member 
States. The Estonian share will be 150 refugees. 
24/08/2015 – Germany announces it will suspend the Dublin regulation and will not set 
limits to the Syrian refugees to enter the country. The statement immediately receives 
critic across Europe and beyond 
27/08/2015 – Austria announces more than 70 refugees found dead in a truck found from 
its territory.  
End of august-beginning of September – thousands of refugees are stuck in the Keleti 
Palyaudvar railway station of Budapest, since the Hungary denies their right to exit the 
country, referring to the Dublin regulation  
02/09/2015 – pictures of a drown Syrian boy found from the Turkish coast spread virally 
in the world media, creating reactions like “Refugees welcome” all over the world 
03/09/2015 – fire in the Vao refugee centre in Estonia 
04/09/2015 – more than thousand of migrants start marching from Hungary towards 
Austria, after being trapped in Keleti Palyaudvar railway station for days 
09/09/2015 – The second Implementation Package is decided on the EU level. The 
Estonian share is additional 373 refugees in addition to the 150 previously agreed. An 
initiative that a country can contribute financially to the refugee crisis instead of 
participating in the distribution program of the refugees 
13/09/2015 – Germany reintroduces border control with Austria. Several countries 
introduce border controls after that within EU 
23/09/2015 – The French President Francois Hollande warns the Central- and Eastern 
European countries, who are critical towards the mandatory distribution system, that if 
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they question solidarity, they should also question their place as the receivers of the EU 
funds 
06/10/2015 – The Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Angela Merkel and 
the President of the French Republic, Francois Hollande give a public speech in front of 
the European Parliament calling for mutual solidarity among EU member states to solve 
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 Aidates sõjapõgenikke nende kodule lähemal, vähendame me rändesurvet Euroopale 
ii
 Arvude taga on päris inimesed. 
iii
 Olukorras, kus inimesed upuvad traagiliselt peame tegelema just selle küsimuse lahendamisega… 
iv
 Eesti riik kaitseb kõigi siin elavate inimeste õigusi. 
v
 me pole võimelised nii suurte inimhulkadega toime tulema. 
vi
 Hetkel panustamegi sellele, kuidas saaks EK-le selgeks teha, et need numbrid on ebaõiglased 
vii
 Me ei pea enam vaidlema valemite üle, saame keskenduda probleemi tuumale ning valmistuda inimeste 
aitamiseks. 
viii
 Me peame suutma näidata skeptilisele maadele, kes nõudsid kohustust ja kvoote, et ka vabatahtlikult 
on võimalik tulemust saavutada. 
ix
 Nad võtavad nädalaga rohkem pagulasi vastu kui Komisjoni pakutud arv kahe aasta peale. 
x
 Pandora laeka jutt ei ole minu jaoks väga sisukas jutt. Kõik mõistavad, et on vaja tegeleda 
tekkepõhjusega, et inimestel ei oleks vaja kodust ära tulla. 
xi
 Lõuna-Eestis on tunda ikka, et infot on vähe. 
xii
 Mis aga eristan Eesti avalikku arvamust nende riikide omast, on see, et sealsetel inimestel on inimlikkust 
palju rohkem. 
xiii
 Meil on vastutustundetuid poliitikuid – ma ei hakka nimesid nimetama, kes kütavad vaenu ja vihkamist. 
xiv
 Kõik nägid kolmeaastase poisi surnukeha. Kuidas saab pärast seda veel sõjapõgenike kohta midagi 
halvasti öelda? Ma ei saa aru, mis inimesed need on. Ma kutsun üles kõiki normaalselt mõtlevaid inimesi: 
avaldage oma arvamust näiteks sotsiaalmeedias. 
xv
 Normaalselt mõtlevaid inimesi 
xvi
 vastutustundetuid poliitikuid, kes külvavad vihkamist ja vaenu 
xvii
 sealsetel inimestel on inimlikkust palju rohkem 
xviii
 Õnneks on meil oma kolleegidega head suhted, saame otse ja avatult rääkida. 
xix
 Eesti kaitses oma seisukohta, et me ei toeta kohustuslikke kvoote ja soovime leida lahendust 
vabatahtlikult panustades. Kuid näiteks Rootsi ütles, et neil pole Komisjoni pakutud numbritega 
probleemi…Seega on erinevatel riikidel erinevad mured. 
xx
 Oleme valmis aitama, aga meetod selleks ei saa olla Brüsseli käsk. 
xxi
 Ettepanek on Eesti suhtes ebaõiglane ja me pole võimelised nii suurte inimhulkadega toime tulema. 
Ebaproportsionaalselt suured kvoodid tekitavad probleeme juurde, mitte ei lahenda neid. 
xxii
 Ma ei tahaks ülemkogule minna kindla numbriga. Kui meil on kindel number, ei ole meil ruumi 
läbirääkimiseks.“ 
xxiii
 Siseministrite kohtumisel ei jõutud ühise otsuseni. Debatt oli kohati laialivalguv, suur hulk riike jätsid 
välja ütlemata, kas nad toetavad kohustuslikke kvoote. 
xxiv
 Kui me läheme sinna kaasas üks number, siis see paneb meid endid väga lukku ja meil ei ole 
mänguruumi. 
xxv
 Kui minnakse küsima liiga väikest hulka, jääb mulje võltssolidaarsusest. 
xxvi
 Mõista tuleb ka nende inimeste saatust, kes on põgenenud sõja või teistsuguste koleduste eest. Oma 
võimaluste piires tuleb meilgi leida endas avastust, et probleemi lahendamisele kaasa rääkida. 
xxvii
 Sõnum on endiselt see, et see on üks osa Euroopa solidaarsusest ja ma näen siin omavalitsuste jaoks 
võimalust, mitte kohustust. 
xxviii
 Nad tulevad siia kusagile korterisse, hakkavad elama oma tavapärast elu. Nad kindlasti ei ole kõik ühes 
kohas. 
xxix
 Pandora laeka jutt ei ole minu jaoks väga sisukas jutt. Kõik mõistavad, et on vaja tegeleda 
tekkepõhjusega, et inimestel ei oleks vaja kodust ära tulla. 
xxx
 Euroopa on kriisis, millele ei ole loota kiiret lahendust. Sellises olukorras on Euroopa ühtsus kriitilise 
tähtsusega, et ellu viia kompleksset ja pikaajalist plaani. 
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xxxi
 Euroopa Liit peab senisest oluliselt jõulisemalt tegelema rändelaine algpõhjustega päritoluriikides, 
suunates sinna humanitaarabi, võideldes inimkaubandusega ja osaledes rahutagamismissioonidel. Piirid 
tuleb saada kontrolli alla ning luua võimalused Süüria rahuprotsessiks. 
xxxii
 Ma kuulasin majutuskeskuses elavate inimeste lugusid ja nende lugude ühisosa on põgenemine sõja 
eest, unistus oma kodust ja töökohast ning hirm võõraviha ees…Mitte keegi ei peaks end Eestis 
ebaturvaliselt tundma. 
xxxiii
 Eesti on osa Euroopast ja meile on omased euroopalikud väärtused. 
xxxiv
 Praegu on aeg näidata üles solidaarsust, kus põgenike jaotusvalem ei ole enam vaidlusküsimus. 
xxxv
 Vastutustundetuks pean ma aga ka seda, kui üks parlamendi erakond lubab endale Riigikogu 
kõnetoolist külvata hüsteeriat lähenevast massirändest. See on lubamatu – mingit massirännet meil 
kindlasti oodata ei ole, rahustab valitsusjuht avalikkust. 
xxxvi
 Venemaa tõttu pole tulnud ÜRO-lt seni mandaati EL-le, mida viimane on taotlenud sekkumiseks 
Süürias. Võime vaid ette kujutada, miks Vmaa on vetostanud või olnud poolt ÜRO mandaadi andmisel. 
xxxvii
 Kui Juncker oma plaaniga kevadel välja tuli, polnud olukord veel nii hull. Ainuüksi augustis tuli EL-I 112 
000 pagulast. Nii kiiret olukorra eskaleerumist ei ennustanud ka EK. 
xxxviii
 Ebaproportsionaalselt suured kvoodid tekitavad probleeme juurde, mitte ei lahenda neid. 
xxxix
 Kohustuslikud kvoodid tekitavad Eestis vastuseisu isegi neis inimestes, kes muidu oleksid nõus pagulasi 
abistama. 
xl
 Eesti pole toetanud kvoote, mille alusel pagulased liikmesriikide vahel ära jaotada. „aga vaadates 
maailma kriise laiemalt ja Eesti seisukohti, otsustasime Ukraina puhul tulla vastu ja pakkuda 
varjupaigavõimalusi. 
xli
 Nädalavahetusel Vahemerel toimunud järjekordest kohutavast tragöödiast rääkides kasutatakse arvude 
keelt: 28 pääsenut, üle 800 uppunu. Iga arvu taga on päris inimene. Hirmunu. Vägivalla eest põgenev. 
Meeleheitel. 
xlii
 Liiga suurt koormat kandvate riikide aitamine vajab enne põhjalikku analüüsi. On tõsi, et osad rigid 
kannavad ebaproportsionaalselt suurt koormat...muidugi tuleb otsida viise, kuidas toetada nende riikide 
pingutusi...see on meie ühine mure, mis puudutab kõiki Euroopa riike, sõltumata nende geograafilisest 
asukohast...meediakajastusest tundub aga teinekord, et põgenike nii-öelda solidaarne laialijagamine 
liikmesriikide vahel ongi kogu selle probleemistiku peamine teema.” 
xliii
 Ma ei taha, et te võtaksite seda kohustusena, vaid et see oleks võimalus näidata üles solidaarsust 
Euroopaga. 
xliv
 Mitte keegi ei peaks end Eestis ebaturvaliselt tundma. 
xlv
 Kindlasti ei saa Eesti sulgeda silmi hätta sattunud liikmesriikide ees ja olla vaid solidaarsuse tarbija. El ei 
ole pelgalt rahakott, vaid ennekõike väärtustel põhinev liit. Oma võimaluste piires saame ja peame aitama. 
xlvi
 Kui palju me siia pagulasi võtame, peab olema vabatahtlik. EL-i tasemel on vastu võetud meetmed, 
kuidas saab seda probleemi lahendada. Selleks ei pea olema nende riiki vastuvõtmine. Oleme EL-iga 
liitunud oma aluslepingute alusel. Kui nüüd pannakse kvalifitseeritud häälteenamuse tulemusel meile 
mingid kohustused, siis see oleks kindlasti pretsedent.  
xlvii
 Euroopa Komisjoni ees võiks Eesti pakutav lahendus olla, et kvoodid meile ei sobi, aga vabatahtlikult 
oleme valmis aktsepteerima, et Itaalia ja Kreeka vajavad praeguses olukorras meie abi…Lähtuda tuleb 
meie hetkevõimekusest pagulasi vastu võtta. Sel aastal on see väga piiratud. 
xlviii
 Eesti peab aitama pagulasi ja neid vastu võttes arvestama Euroopa Komisjoni soovituste ja meie 
võimalustega.“ 
xlix
 Ettepanek on Eesti suhtes ebaõiglane ja me pole võimelised nii suurte inimhulkadega toime tulema. 
Ebaproportsionaalselt suured kvoodid tekitavad probleeme juurde, mitte ei lahenda neid. 
l
 Tugevdada tuleks tsiviil- ja militaarkoostööd. Keskenduma peaks probleemi algpõhjustele ehk tegevustele 
kolmandates riikides, kust põgenikud tulevad. 
li
 Kui EK ettepanek on 100 000, siis võime arvestada, et see on ligikaudu 200 inimest veel 
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lii
 Ja me pole surve all, kui meie argumendid on õiged…ja õnneks on meil oma kolleegidega head suhted 
ning saame rääkida otse ja avatult. 
liii
 Riik läheb omavalitsustele appi, et omavalitsuste koormus oleks nii väike kui võimalik. 
liv
 Mõista tuleb ka nende inimeste saatust, kes on põgenenud sõja või teistsuguste koleduste eest. 
lv
 Liibanonis peavad 4.5 milj inimest hakkama saama 1.5 milj põgenikuga. EL-s elab 500 milj inimest ja 
praegu spekuleeritakse 100 000 kuni 160 000 põgeniku aitamisest. Selles valguses 500 milj inimese peale 
aidata 100 000 inimest… 
lvi
 Elame avatud maailmas ja kõik see, mis on Euroopas, jõuab varem või hiljem ka Eestisse. Seepärast on 
meil kohustus ennetavalt sisserändega seonduvad probleemid omakeskis läbi arutada ja vajadusel ka 
vastavad reeglid kehtestada 
lvii
 Ma väga loodan, et EK ei tule uuesti tagasi sellise ideega, mis on korra valitsusjuhtide poolt tagasi 
lükatud. 
